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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the implications of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in 
Riley v. California for the search of electronic devices at the border, termed 
“electronic border searches.” It explores the degree to which such searches 
continue to be constitutionally permissible and contrasts Riley’s categorical rule 
protecting electronic devices in the interior with the general search power granted 
the government at the border. Following an examination of the divergences among 
lower courts in applying Riley, it finds Riley has limited application to the conduct of 
electronic border searches and that they continue to be constitutionally permissible. 
This thesis also explores how the reasonableness of such searches can be maintained 
despite evolving technology and privacy perceptions. By examining other legislative 
and constitutional rules, it derives an approach for electronic border searches where 
powerful government interests and privacy concerns collide. The result is a view of 
electronic devices at the border as hybrid property—as both containers and novel 
“effects.” Accordingly, this thesis advocates a hybrid-scope-limited approach that 
tethers suspicion-less electronic border searches to the original rationale for the 
border search doctrine. It presents a bifurcated framework leading to a two-tiered, 
hybrid-scope-limited rule where distinct levels of intrusion into electronic devices at 
the border are tied to differential levels of suspicion. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The border search doctrine authorizes U.S. customs officers to conduct warrantless, 
suspicion-less searches of persons and property crossing the U.S. border.1 Since the 
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California, arguments that electronic devices 
and their accompanying data qualify as a different type of property that should be protected 
from general searches at the border have grown.2 This thesis examines whether, in the 
aftermath of Riley’s declaration of special categorical protection for electronic devices in 
the interior, general searches of electronic devices at the border are Constitutional. An 
analysis of decisions by lower courts that confronted the electronic border search question 
since Riley finds that some reject equating electronic devices to other physical containers 
crossing the border and that such searches are only reasonable “if relevant government 
interests are present.”3 Other courts have gone further and significantly narrowed customs 
officers’ authority to conduct electronic border searches.4 Still others, however, have, in 
light of the historic breadth of the government’s authority to search people and property at 
the Nation’s borders, found Riley irrelevant.5 The result is significant divergence in opinion 
within the U.S. judiciary as to the reasonableness of the government’s conduct of electronic 
border searches, including their proper scope and manner. In answering this question, this 
thesis finds that unique aspects of the Riley decision itself, its context, and circumstances 
demand a narrow, vice broad, application of its holding. Furthermore, this thesis explains 
that given their provenance and abundant statutory support, border searches, including 
those of electronic devices and data, are an exemption to the Fourth Amendment, not an 
1 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
2 Laura K. Donohue, “Customs, Immigration, and Rights: Constitutional Limits on Electronic Border 
Searches,” Yale Law Journal Forum 128 (2019): 961–1015, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/
customs-immigration-and-rights; Thomas Mann Miller, “Digital Border Searches after Riley v. California,” 
Washington Law Review 90, no. 4 (2015): 1943–96. 
3 United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 142, 145–46 (4th Cir. 2018). 
4 United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019); Alasaad v. McAleenan, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC 
(D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019). 
5 United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 
(11th Cir. 2018). 
x 
exception like the searches at issue in Riley. As a result, despite the fervor created by Riley, 
electronic border searches continue to be a Constitutionally reasonable exercise of the 
broad authority vested in customs officers over all that enters and exits the country. 
This thesis also addresses a second question: how can the reasonableness of 
electronic border searches be maintained in the face of evolving technology and 
concomitant privacy concerns that troubled the Riley Court? To answer this question, a 
view of electronic devices and their stored data as a hybrid form of property is presented. 
This perspective recognizes the duality of electronic devices—as both containers and novel 
effects—where powerful government and individual privacy interests collide. In discussing 
this perspective, this thesis details other constitutionally sanctioned approaches that 
balances these competing interests when new technology and new threats emerge. In 
addition to an examination of the border search doctrine itself and a discussion as to how 
electronic devices should be treated under the doctrine moving forward, this thesis reviews 
other existing U.S. statutory regimes specifically developed for governing government 
access to information in which people have significant privacy expectations. The resulting 
deductive and inductive analysis details how the hybrid view empowers the government to 
counter novel threats at the border while protecting privacy in data that does not pertain to 
the government’s broad rationale for conducting suspicion-less border searches. In 
presenting the hybrid model for electronic devices at the border, its advantages, including 
its maintenance of technological and mode neutrality in border searches of all property as 
well its ability to adapt to changing privacy attitudes, are discussed.6 
Building on this hybrid view of electronic devices at the border, this thesis outlines 
a hybrid-scope-limited approach for electronic border searches. This approach tethers 
suspicion-less electronic border searches to the original rationale underlying the border 
search doctrine which encompass the following areas:  
6 See Orin S. Kerr, “Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach,” Stanford 
Law Review 62, no. 4 (2010): 1005–49; Richard McAdams, “Riley’s Less Obvious Tradeoff: Forgoing 
Scope-Limited Searches,” Texas Tech Law Review 48 (2015): 97–131; Thomas K. Clancy, “Fourth 
Amendment Satisfaction—The ‘Reasonableness’ of Digital Searches,” Texas Tech Law Review 48 (2015): 
37–63; and Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606. 
xi 
∑ national security,  
∑ the collection of duty and regulation of trade,  
∑ preventing the introduction of harmful goods, and 
∑ regulating immigration to prevent the entry of illegal, inadmissible, or 
unwanted persons.   
A two-tiered framework for the implementation of this approach is then introduced in 
which distinct levels of government intrusion into electronic devices at the border are tied 
to differential levels of suspicion. Within this discussion, this thesis examines the 
reasonableness of such searches using forensic tools that allow for a search of all data 
present on an electronic device, including that which has been deleted and that which is 
opaque to the user. In addition, it presents an analysis as to why reasonable suspicion, 
following the accepted definition of that term from the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Terry v. Ohio, should be the standard for electronic border searches of increased scope and 
manner—so-called second-tier searches.7 Ultimately, this thesis advances a tiered, hybrid-
scope-limited rule that adheres to the long-established border dynamic where the 
government’s authority is at its “zenith” and an individual’s right to privacy is greatly 
diminished.8 This construct provides guidance to customs officers for dealing with the 
unique issues involved in conducting electronic border searches. In doing so, it allows for 
the maintenance of reasonableness, now and in the future, in the depth, breadth, and manner 
of customs officers’ intrusions into digital property at the border. 
 
7 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
8 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
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1 
I. THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE AND ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES 
The border search doctrine, as it exists in the United States, holds that all persons 
and property, when crossing the nation’s borders, are subject to suspicion-less search. The 
purpose is simply to protect the nation and the people from a host of threats. For this reason, 
customs offices can search anything that crosses the border, whether it be a suitcase, a 
parcel, a shipping container, or a person, without warrant or probable cause. And aside 
from invasive searches of a person’s body, no justification for the search is necessary. 
However, with the advent of modern electronic devices—and in light of the extensiveness 
of their use and the nature of the data they contain—the question arises as to whether these 
devices should receive the same treatment under the border search doctrine as any other 
suitcase or container. 
Are electronic devices somehow different for the purposes of search by law 
enforcement officials? In 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Riley v. California 
which for the first time accorded electronic devices increased protection from government 
searches—in this case, search incident to arrest of a person inside the United States—
beyond that of traditional property.1 Since then, the momentum of Riley has inspired some 
courts to extend this logic to other kinds of searches—right up to the U.S. borders. Based 
on a careful analysis of the relevant law and practice—beginning with the unique character 
of the border search doctrine itself—this thesis argues that despite the Riley decision, 
searches of electronic devices at the border, do not violate the Constitution. This thesis, 
however, goes further and recognizes that the technological innovations of the future 
represent an unending challenge to the government’s border authority over electronic 
devices and the digital property they hold. Consequently, this thesis argues that searches 
of electronic devices need a structure to ensure their scope and the manner in which they 
are conducted maintain their reasonableness in the future. This thesis proposes such a 
 
1 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
2 
structure with a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited conceptual framework that will make 
electronic border searches effective and secure their continued constitutionality. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The border search doctrine allows certain government officials to conduct 
warrantless, suspicion-less searches of persons and property crossing the U.S. border.2 
Despite Fourth Amendment requirements that typically prohibit general searches—
”fishing expeditions” in modern parlance—searches at the border, particularly routine 
searches, have long been viewed as different.3 Unlike inside the country, where the 
protection of personal liberty is the pre-eminent concern, at the border, the government’s 
interest in protecting the nation and the people from harm through robust search powers 
reigns supreme. 
In light of the Riley decision, the U.S. circuit courts disagree as to whether 
electronic border searches should be permissible under the Fourth Amendment or 
constitute unreasonable infringements of individuals’ privacy.4 Neither Congress nor the 
Supreme Court has taken definitive action or given clear direction in this regard, leaving 
executive agencies uncertain about how to establish a proper practice. In some areas of the 
country, notably in the Ninth Circuit, electronic border searches have been all but 
prohibited except for a narrow exception.5 Others, like the Eleventh Circuit, however, have 
upheld the practice as entirely constitutional despite Riley.6 Some circuits, like the Fourth 
Circuit, have attempted to reconcile Riley with existing border search precedent.7 Still other 
circuits, among them the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, in failing to delineate clear 
 
2 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
3 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537–541 (1985). 
4 Gina Bohannon, “Cell Phones and the Border Search Exception: Circuits Split over the Line between 
Sovereignty and Privacy,” Maryland Law Review 78, no. 3 (2019): 563–603. 
5 United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019). 
6 United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018). 
7 United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018). 
3 
reasonableness standards, have demonstrated their own indecision and apprehension in the 
face of these electronic border search questions.8 
Amid the current legal upheaval, however, customs officers have been left in an 
increasingly untenable position.9 They are charged with wielding broad authority without 
clear legal guidance in how to properly circumscribe electronic border searches.10 In 
addition, open questions surround government detention of electronic devices as well as 
which steps customs officers may take in overcoming device passwords and encryption 
when exercising their border authority.11 The lack of legal clarity has ultimately left the 
government vulnerable to losing items of evidence that could be used in support of 
prosecutions that increase national security and uphold the nation’s customs and 
immigration laws.12 These vagaries have also exposed the government and homeland 
security practitioners as individuals to civil liability for actions taken in an increasingly 
gray area at the nation’s borders.13 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California, should 
warrantless electronic border searches continue to be constitutionally 
permissible? 
2. If so, how can customs agents execute electronic border searches, in 
manner and scope, to ensure continuing reasonableness? 
 
8 See, for example, United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019); and United States v. 
Williams, 942 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2019). 
9 Hillel R. Smith, Do Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices at the Border Violate the Fourth 
Amendment?, CRS Report No. LSB10387 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019). 
10 Smith. 
11 Laura Nowell, “Privacy at the Border: Applying the Border Search Exception to Digital Searches at 
the United States Border,” Federal Communications Law Journal 71, no. 1 (2019): 85–104. 
12 Cano, 934 F.3d 1002. 
13 Alasaad v. McAleenan, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019). For example, if a customs 
officer conducts an electronic border search of a traveler’s devices pursuant to the government’s 
historically recognized broad border authorities and a court deems that search unconstitutional, reasoning 
Riley demands that electronic devices receive special protection, that customs officer could be subject to a 
Bivins action for violating the traveler’s constitutional rights. 
4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a nebulous concept that can vary 
depending on the facts of a given case. Also, what is considered reasonable depends on the 
object of the search or seizure. Proper conduct in searching a vehicle can be unreasonable 
when searching a home. Which type of government activity is constitutionally sanctioned 
differs whether the search of a property or a person. Consequently, to determine whether a 
border search of electronic devices and data is constitutionally reasonable post-Riley, one 
must first ascertain the category of property into which modern electronic devices fall. An 
answer here determines the degree of legal protection afforded these devices. To date, 
however, no universal legal construct definitively categorizing electronic devices and 
defining their treatment as property has emerged. 
Leading Fourth Amendment legal scholars have struggled with how to approach 
electronic device searches as a subcategory of property searches.14 Despite being 
intangible, data stored on these devices is property. And much of this data has physical 
world analogues for which established Fourth Amendment rules exist. Data, however, can 
be highly personal. Thus, concerns about dignity and privacy intrusions resulting from 
searches of electronic devices carry greater weight than in other property searches.15 The 
hybrid nature of electronic devices and data—paralleling traditional property in some 
aspects but being completely novel in others—has strained traditional Fourth Amendment 
 
14 Orin S. Kerr, “Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data,” Yale Law Journal 119, no. 4 (2010): 
700–724.  
15 See, for example, United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005); Constitution Project, 
Suspicionless Laptop Searches under the Border Search Doctrine: Legal and Privacy Concerns with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Policy (Washington, DC: Constitution Project, 2011); Christine A. 
Coletta, “Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border Search Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment,” Boston College Law Review 48, no. 4 (2007): 971–1007; Victoria Wilson, “Laptops and the 
Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment: Protecting the United States Borders from Bombs, 
Drugs, and the Pictures from Your Vacation,” University of Miami Law Review 65, no. 3 (2011): 999–
1025; Scott J. Upright, “Suspicionless Border Seizures of Electronic Files: The Overextension of the 
Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment,” William and Mary Law Review 51, no. 1 (2009): 
291–326; Ari B. Fontecchio, “Suspicionless Laptop Searches under the Border Search Doctrine: The 
Fourth Amendment Exception That Swallows Your Laptop,” Cardozo Law Review 31 (2009): 231–66; 
Laura K. Donohue, “Customs, Immigration, and Rights: Constitutional Limits on Electronic Border 
Searches,” Yale Law Journal Forum 128 (2019): 961–1015, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/
customs-immigration-and-rights; and Thomas Mann Miller, “Digital Border Searches after Riley v. 
California,” Washington Law Review 90, no. 4 (2015): 1943–96. 
5 
rules, which, like the border search doctrine, bifurcate searches into general categories of 
property and people.16 At the border, this distinction is stark; searches of property do not 
carry the same compelling personal dignity concerns that invasive searches of the body 
do.17 
Significant heterogeneity in how electronic devices, as new technology, should be 
treated within the general category of property under the Fourth Amendment has 
developed.18 Divergent views have been articulated in the context of Fourth Amendment 
searches generally and in the context of border searches specifically.19 Some courts and 
observers have considered electronic devices as a type of personal container holding data 
much as other containers, like filing cabinets, hold a person’s papers.20 Rules governing 
containers in the context of the Fourth Amendment have been well-delineated.21 Several 
courts considering border searches of laptop computers have followed the container theory 
in refusing to carve out special protections for such devices.22 These courts have equated 
 
16 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
17 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. 
18 See, for example, Thomas K. Clancy, “Fourth Amendment Satisfaction—The “Reasonableness” of 
Digital Searches,” Texas Tech Law Review 48 (2015): 37–63; Orin S. Kerr, “An Equilibrium-Adjustment 
Theory of The Fourth Amendment,” Harvard Law Review 125, no. 2 (2011): 476–543; Orin S. Kerr, 
“Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 36, no. 2 
(Spring 2013): 403–8; Orin S. Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution,” Michigan Law Review 102, no. 5 (March 2004): 801, https://doi.org/10.2307/
4141982; Cynthia Lee, “Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container 
Doctrine Can Tell Us about the Fourth Amendment,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 100, no. 4 
(Fall 2010): 1403–94; Richard McAdams, “Riley’s Less Obvious Tradeoff: Forgoing Scope-Limited 
Searches,” Texas Tech Law Review 48 (2015): 97–131; and Christopher Slobogin, “An Original Take on 
Originalism,” Harvard Law Review 125, no. 2 (2011): 14–22. 
19 See, for example, Patrick Corbett, “The Future of Digital Evidence Searches and Seizures: The 
Future of the Fourth Amendment in a Digital Evidence Context: Where Would the Supreme Court Draw 
the Electronic Line at the International Border?,” Mississippi Law Journal 81, no. 5 (2012): 1263–1308; 
Sid Nadkarni, “‘Let’s Have a Look Shall We?’ A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless Border Searches of 
Portable Electronic Devices,” UCLA Law Review 61 (2013): 146–94; Nathan A. Sales, “Run for the 
Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amendment,” University of Richmond Law Review 43, no. 3 
(2009): 1091–1134; and Rachel Flipse, “An Unbalanced Standard: Search and Seizure of Electronic Data 
under the Border Search Doctrine,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 3 
(2010): 851–74. 
20 Orin S. Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,” Harvard Law Review 119, no. 2 (2005): 
539. 
21 Kerr, 550. 
22 United States v. Arnold, 33 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). 
6 
laptop computers with physical pieces of luggage containing personal property subject to 
suspicion-less border searches.23 This so-called container view of electronic devices has 
been further reflected in the border search policies of Customs and Border Protection and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement—Homeland Security Investigations.24 Other 
courts have even used the container analogy to reason that, at the border, electronic devices 
and their data are simply cargo.25 Proponents of this perspective laud the container theory 
for its technological neutrality.26 Treating electronic devices as personal containers allows 
for the application of traditional rules regarding reasonableness, which at the border means 
all data contained within is subject to full examination without suspicion or a warrant. 
The container theory, however, has not garnered consensus. Many reject treating 
electronic devices as containers and data as personal chattel. Several articles have 
questioned whether it is logical, given the potential privacy implications, to treat a laptop 
and its stored data as only another piece of luggage.27 Critics argue that electronic devices 
carry data previously only contained in private homes.28 Moreover, these devices can carry 
this private information in quantities previously unimaginable.29 Critics reason that but for 
these devices, people would not be carrying this type and quantity of private information 
across international boundaries.30 In other words, electronic devices differ significantly 
 
23 Arnold, 33 F.3d at 1007. 
24 Customs and Border Protection, Border Searches of Electronic Devices, Directive No. 3340-049A 
(Washington, DC: Customs and Border Protection, 2018); Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border 
Searches of Electronic Devices, Directive No. 7-6.1 (Washington, DC: Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, 2009).  
25 Ickes, 393 F.3d 501. 
26 Sales, “Run for the Border,” 1114–15. 
27 Kevin Fayle, “Dignity, Privacy and Hard Drives: Laptops and the Border Search Exception to the 
Fourth Amendment,” Law/Technology 41, no. 4 (2008): 24; Wilson, “Laptops and the Border Search 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment,” 1009; Fontecchio, “Suspicionless Laptop Searches,” 249–53. 
28 Sunil Bector, “Your Laptop, Please: The Search and Seizure of Electronic Devices at the United 
States Border,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 24, no. 1 (2009): 705. 
29 Rasha Alzahabi, “Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling Abroad? The Fourth 
Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers,” Indiana Law Review 41, no. 1 (2008): 178–83, 
https://doi.org/10.18060/3928. Nathan Sales points out that a 250 GB hard drive can store “the equivalent 
of 125 million printed pages of text” and that “only sixty-three” 250 GB hard drives would be needed to 
“store the entire collection of the Library of Congress.” Sales, “Run for the Border,” 1099–1100. 
30 Alzahabi, “Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home?,” 179. 
7 
from baggage carrying a traveler’s personal items. As a result, many scholars express 
concern that placing these devices under the universal merchandise umbrella, without 
special designation, affords border agents the ability to intrude on personal privacy on a 
frightening scale without justification.31 
In particular, container-theory contrarians argue a special approach to electronic 
devices at the border needs to be adopted.32 Under this approach, observers postulate the 
government should be required to obtain at least some level of suspicion of criminal 
activity for electronic border searches to be constitutionally reasonable.33 Some in 
Congress have adopted this view, arguing electronic devices deserve increased protection 
at the border.34 
Some courts have begun to rethink the container view. For example, courts have 
recognized that a border search using forensic software will recover information on the 
device that the user has deleted and may be unaware of its continued presence.35 Thus, if 
an electronic device is no different from a suitcase, a forensic search of the device is akin 
to not only searching the contents of the suitcase currently stored therein but also anything 
that has ever been carried in that suitcase.36 Still other courts continue to apply traditional 
property rules to electronic devices at the border. Specifically, these courts note, among 
other things, that electronic devices can contain material electronically that carried in a 
physical form across the border would be unquestionably subject to search regardless of 
how private the material.37 They question the logic of granting special protections for 
property crossing the border based simply on the form in which it is carried.38 
 
31 Eunice Park, “The Elephant in the Room: What Is a ‘Nonroutine’ Border Search, Anyway? Digital 
Device Searches Post-Riley,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 44 (2017): 298–300. 
32 Clancy, “Fourth Amendment Satisfaction,” 38. 
33 Constitution Project, Suspicionless Border Searches of Electronic Devices, 11. 
34 Fayle, “Dignity, Privacy and Hard Drives,” 24. 
35 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013). 
36 Cotterman, at 965. 
37 Touset, 890 F.3d 1227. 
38 Touset, at 1236. 
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Advocates of treating electronic devices and their data as a special category of 
property at the border, however, have failed to reach consensus on the degree of special 
protection required. Some have articulated the government should have probable cause and 
possibly a warrant for border searches of electronic devices where files are to be copied as 
they are in forensic border exams.39 Others have argued for the need for reasonable 
suspicion.40 Still others consider electronic devices as a type of property in which the 
government may intrude without warrant so long as customs officers have at least one 
reason for doing so.41 These varying ideas about the level of justification customs agents 
need to penetrate the sanctity of individuals’ electronic devices creates uncertainty about 
the extent border authorities can be exercised vis-à-vis such property. 
The evolution of electronic devices and the Supreme Court decision in Riley have 
further confused rather than clarified the question of how electronic devices should be 
considered at the border. The debate has grown from arguments over whether these devices 
require a special approach to arguments declaring them to be novel forms of property under 
the Fourth Amendment. Those presenting the latter position claim that searches of personal 
electronic devices are more than property searches equivalent to searches of a person’s 
“brain.”42 As such, these observers argue, the border search of electronic devices require 
new rules. In Congress, Senators sponsoring the Protecting Data at the Border Act in 2018 
argued that electronic devices should receive dissimilar treatment under law.43 Such novel 
treatment could result in electronic devices and their data protected at the border to the 
same or greater degree than a person’s body. This extremity carries the potential to nullify 
any application of the border search doctrine to electronic devices regardless of the weight 
of government interests involved. 
 
39 Upright, “Suspicionless Border Seizures of Electronic Files,” 323–24. 
40 Kelly A. Gilmore, “Preserving the Border Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing 
Electronic Evidence at the Border,” Brooklyn Law Review, 72, no. 2 (2007): 792. 
41 Fontecchio, “Suspicionless Laptop Searches,” 266. 
42 Coletta, “Laptop Searches at the United States Borders,” 1007. 
43 Examining Warrantless Smartphone Searches at the Border: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Senate, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 2018, 2. 
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Further confounding efforts to develop a coherent approach to electronic devices at 
the border has been the rapid development and societal adoption of smartphones. To many, 
smartphones represent rich repositories of the most intimate details of life—and also a 
necessity in today’s world.44 Thus, recent critics of suspicion-less electronic border 
searches have argued that smartphones stand apart from traditional forms of property and 
all other electronic devices.45 Some in Congress have noted with incredulity attempts to 
equate smartphones with suitcases.46 Hence, electronic border search critics believe that 
both the volume of intimate information smartphones contain and its quality justifies the 
novel property categorization of these devices.47 In other words, a person cannot put in a 
suitcase as much self-revealing material as he or she puts on a smartphone—intentionally 
or nor. For example, a smartphone contains data on a user’s movements and locations as 
well as applications that track everything from the user’s health symptoms to religious and 
political affiliations.48 Thus, questions of special designations and protections of personal 
smartphones, independent of all other electronic devices, have fueled the growing 
electronic border search dilemma. 
The current state of conflicting case law involving electronic border searches 
reveals the judiciary’s struggle in considering electronic devices as property.49 As courts 
continue to review electronic border searches, with increasing focus on searches of 
personal smartphones, consensus appears ever more remote. Some have questioned 
whether courts should be taking the lead in determining whether new types of technology 
receive disparate levels of Fourth Amendment protection.50 In fact, given the nature of the 
judicial process, courts are ill-positioned to make such decisions.51 Some scholars have 
even used the Riley decision and the rationale of the Court in that case to illustrate, that 
 
44 Riley, 573 U.S. at 2485–86, 2493–98. 
45 Donohue, “Customs, Immigration, and Rights,” 999, 1002–3. 
46 S., Examining Warrantless Smartphone Searches at the Border, 2. 
47 Donohue, “Customs, Immigration, and Rights,” 1006. 
48 Miller, “Digital Border Searches after Riley,” 1978. 
49 “The Border Search Muddle,” Harvard Law Review 132 (2019): 2279. 
50 Mary Leary, “The Supreme Digital Divide,” Texas Tech Law Review 48 (2015): 70–72. 
51 Leary, 92–94. 
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courts have a poor understanding of evolving technology in the context of modern life.52 
Thus, the resulting Fourth Amendment rules become unsustainable in the long term 
because rather than striking a balance between government interests and individual liberty, 
the Court’s rationale leads to reactionary, ad hoc decisions incapable of adaptation.53 
Learned observers make compelling arguments that courts, traditionally the arbiters 
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, should exercise caution when considering new 
technologies and novel treatment.54 Instead of declaring electronic devices and data to be 
akin to other forms of property or forging new categories with new rules, they call for 
courts to exercise restraint and use legislative trends as guides.55 To these scholars, the 
question as to which type of property electronic devices are to be considered under the 
Fourth Amendment, and as such, any added degrees of protection they may have, is one of 
societal considerations of reasonableness.56 Specifically, properly categorizing electronic 
devices and their data as property depends on how private the American body politic finds 
them; and what additional requirements, if any, should be imposed on the government prior 
to conducting electronic searches, regardless of search location.57 Therefore, many 
observers argue that Congress could better answer how electronic devices should be treated 
under the Fourth Amendment: in short, are electronic devices like traditional containers, a 
special type of property requiring modification to traditional rules, or a novel category of 
property requiring greater protection than other types of personal chattel.58 As courts have 
tackled this question in the context of border searches, stark contrasts in definitions of 
reasonableness and conflicting rulings have emerged.59 
 
52 Leary, 72–90. 
53 Leary, 85. 
54 Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies,” 801. 
55 Kerr, 875–77.  
56 Leary, “The Supreme Digital Divide,” 92. 
57 Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies,” 884–88. 
58 Kerr, 855–60. 
59 See, for example, Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133; Touset, 890 F.3d 1227; Cano, 934 F.3d 1002; and Alasaad, 
No. 17-cv-11730-DJC. 
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D. THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE: STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
Until the arrival of Riley, border search law had marked stability and there was 
significant statutory and precedential deference. The border search doctrine, which de-
emphasizes personal rights in favor of territorial sovereignty, was codified by the First 
Congress on July 31, 1789, and predates the passage of the statutes that would come to be 
known as the Bill of Rights.60 In sections 23–26 of an act titled “the Collection of the Duties 
Imposed by law on the Tonnage of Ships or Vessels, and on Goods, Wares and 
Merchandises Imported into the United States,” Congress authorized customs collectors 
and other officers to enter any ship or vessel and search wherever for any goods, wares, or 
merchandise that may be found.61 In 1790, Congress further authorized customs officers to 
“free[ly] access” anything entering the country including “any box, trunk, chest, cask, or 
other package.”62 Modern border search statutes, rooted in these early acts, have continued 
to provide for “plenary” customs officer search authority.63 For example, Title 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(a) specifically allows customs officers to, among other things, examine, inspect, 
and search “any person, trunk, package, or cargo.”64 By the same token, Title 19 U.S.C. § 
482, authorizes customs officers, in part, to “stop, search, and examine . . . any person” and 
to search any property transiting the border including all manner of personal goods, even 
“envelope[s].”65 At the border, all property is considered “merchandise.”66 “Merchandise” 
itself is defined, per the Tariff Act of 1930, as “goods, wares, and chattels of every 
description . . . includ[ing] merchandise the importation of which is prohibited.”67 Per the 
statute, “merchandise” is not confined to commerce but applies to individuals’ personal 
 
60 Richard Peters, ed., The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from the 
Organization of the Government in 1789, to March 3, 1845, vol. 1 (Boston: Charles C. Little and James 
Brown, 1845), 29–49, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/1st-congress/c1.pdf. 
61 Peters, 43. 
62 Peters, 164. 
63 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616. 
64 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2010). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1461 (2011); 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (2008); and 19 
C.F.R. §§ 162.6–162.7 (2012). 
65 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2010). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1467 (2011), which further authorizes customs officers 
to search “persons, baggage, or merchandise” arriving from foreign locales. 
66 19 U.S.C. § 482. 
67 19 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2011). 
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property as well.68 In short, Congress has stated that everything is subject to search at the 
border. 
Other statutes further delineate border search authority and reinforce its intended 
broad scope. Title 19 U.S.C. § 1461 authorizes the border inspection of “merchandise and 
baggage” and requires a person carrying “any trunk, traveling bag, sack, valise, or other 
container, or of any closed vehicle, to open the same for inspection, to furnish a key or 
other means for opening same.”69 Title 19 U.S.C. § 1467 authorize searches of “persons, 
baggage, or merchandise,” to ensure compliance with all customs “laws, regulations, and 
instructions” as well as those that the “Customs Service” enforces.70 Title 19 U.S.C. § 1582 
authorizes the search of persons and baggage entering the United States in accordance with 
additional regulations.71 These include Title 19 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 
162.6, which authorizes the border search of “all persons, baggage, and merchandise,” 
arriving in the United States from a foreign country or territory.72 Another, Title 19 C.F.R. 
Part 162.7 authorizes the “stop, search, and examin[ation] [of] any vehicle, person, or beast, 
or search [of] any trunk or envelope wherever found” (emphasis added).73 Well before 
Riley, Congress even confirmed that the broad customs authority over all property crossing 
the border included electronic devices and data. Title 6 U.S.C. Sec 211(k)(A), still in effect, 
explicitly commands the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) commissioner to develop 
“standard operating procedures for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing 
 
68 Alfonso Robles, Law Course for Customs and Border Protection Officers, 13th ed. (Glynco, GA: 
Gould Publications, 2004), 159. Arriving individuals to the United States from places foreign are also 
subject to inspection and examination pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (2011). This section and its statutory 
siblings specifically allow for the border search of individuals and their property for purposes of 
determining their admissibility. Though an important authority in the realm of border search, especially 
considering the government’s authority to encounter foreign nationals and search their belongings, it is not 
as broad as the customs statutes discussed, as border searches under this heading are limited to the purposes 
of determining the person’s admissibility. Consequently, we will focus on the broader customs statutes 
providing for the search of all things, i.e., merchandise, crossing the U.S. territorial boundaries.  
69 19 U.S.C. § 1461. 
70 19 U.S.C. § 1467. 
71 19 U.S.C. § 1582. 
72 19 C.F.R. § 162.6. 
73 19 C.F.R. § 162.7. 
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information contained in communication, electronic or digital devices encountered . . . at 
United States ports of entry” (emphasis added).74 
Based on this long statutory lineage, courts have routinely endorsed searches at the 
border as reasonable, do not require probable cause, and never require a warrant.75 In 1886, 
the Supreme Court, in Boyd v. United States, conspicuously recognized the scope of the 
border search doctrine and its attendant statutes to be in complete harmony with 
constitutional protections.76 Nearly 100 years later, in U.S. v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court, 
affirmed the “plenary power” given to customs officers to conduct searches at the border.77 
In declaring border searches “grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to 
control . . . who and what may enter the country” the Court found “manifest” the “historical 
importance of the enactment of this customs statute by the same Congress which proposed 
the Fourth Amendment.”78 In subsequent cases, the Court established the precedent of 
affording deferential treatment to border search statutes given their “impressive historical 
pedigree.”79 The Supreme Court has so firmly established the reasonableness of 
government searches at the border including body searches as necessary “to protect the 
Nation.”80 Even in the digital age, the Court established as “axiomatic that the United 
States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in 
protecting, its territorial integrity” and, at the international border, both are at their “zenith” 
(emphasis added).81 This precedent acknowledged the border as exempt from Fourth 
Amendment protections in stark contrast to the interior of the country where personal 
liberty commands the greatest force. 
 
74 6 U.S.C. § 211(k)(1)(A) (2014). 
75 Judith B. Ittig, “The Rites of Passage: Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment,” Tennessee Law 
Review 40 (1973): 329. 
76 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). 
77 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616. 
78 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–17, 620. 
79 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983). 
80 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538–39. 
81 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152–53. 
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Before Riley, electronic border searches were almost universally deemed 
reasonable based on comparing electronic devices to containers that warehoused data much 
in the same way that other physical containers hold tangible items.82 This rationale led one 
observer to summarize that early views by courts of electronic border searches took the 
form of “border search exceptionalism.”83 One appellate ruling, five years before Riley, 
affirmed that the border search doctrine rested on the United States’ “inherent sovereign 
authority to protect its territorial integrity” and such authority entitled the government “to 
require that whoever seeks entry must establish the right . . . to bring into the country 
whatever he may carry.”84 Another pre-Riley decision defined the government’s search 
authority at the border to be “sweeping” and electronic border searches as entirely 
consistent with the Constitution.85 These decisions relied on the language of border search 
statutes and the use of “the embracive term ‘cargo.’”86 The broad definition of “cargo” as 
“goods transported by a vessel, airplane, or vehicle,” helped to outline the acceptable 
objects of search.87 Congress’ assiduous use of the word “any” in its border search statutes, 
especially as a modifier regarding what can be searched, was highlighted.88 Thus, before 
Riley, electronic devices were “cargo” subject to such searches. 
Only one appellate court before Riley stood even slightly apart from the “border 
search exceptionalism” perspective.89 In 2013, a year before the Riley decision, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Cotterman discussed an electronic border search that 
included a forensic search of a traveler’s personal laptop computer.90 The Cotterman court 
compared border searches using forensic tools to “an exhaustive exploratory search,” akin 
 
82 Miller, “Digital Border Searches after Riley,” 1961. 
83 “The Border Search Muddle,” 2280–81. 
84 Arnold, 33 F.3d at 1006–7. 
85 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 503, 505. 
86 Ickes, at 504. 
87 Ickes, at 504 
88 Ickes, at 504. 
89 “The Border Search Muddle,” 2281. 
90 Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952. 
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to a strip search, that is “more intrusive than [searches of] other forms of property.”91 
Cotterman noted that forensic searches will recover deleted information and tantamount to 
searching a container not only for its current contents but also for all of its previous 
contents.92 As a result, Cotterman counter-balanced border search exceptionalist 
arguments with data exceptionalist arguments and found suspicion-less forensic border 
searches to be unreasonable.93 Such was the state of electronic border search law before 
Riley. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In light of the Riley decision, this project combines legal along with deductive and 
inductive analysis to address the issues of the constitutionality of electronic border searches 
and their reasonableness in practice. It begins by looking at the ramifications of Riley, 
arguments for the severe truncation of electronic border searches, and the conflicting rules 
from the lower courts concerning the practice, given the history of the border search 
doctrine and Riley’s discussion of electronic devices as unique property. The thesis 
explores the compatibility of electronic border searches with the Fourth Amendment by 
viewing electronic devices and their stored data as hybrid property necessitating a scope-
limited search approach. In doing so, it will detail other constitutionally sanctioned hybrid 
and scope-limited approaches developed to balance new technology, new threats, and 
government interests. Inductive analysis here will also involve an examination of existing 
U.S. statutory regimes specifically developed for governing government access to 
electronic data and for countering novel threats at the border. This deductive and inductive 
legal analysis will likely result in recommending a scope-limited rule for electronic border 
search that seeks to balance the government interests versus privacy rights. 
Analysis then turns to the constitutionality of electronic border search in practice. 
It focuses on applying a scope-limited rule and dealing with unique challenges involved in 
 
91 Cotterman, at 962–64, 966. 
92 Cotterman, at 965. 
93 “The Border Search Muddle,” 2282. This source articulates the data-exceptionalist perspective in 
Riley and evident in subsequent electronic border search cases. 
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searches of electronic devices. This thesis also discusses tethering electronic border search 
protocols to existing legal regimes governing the search of novel technology including 
devices and data that have been accepted as constitutionally sound. This approach 
highlights the comparative reasonableness of electronic border searches conducted using 
these protocols. Ultimately, this thesis argues that a hybrid-scope-limited approach to 
electronic border searches is both permissible and desirable post-Riley, and it identifies 
protocols that should be enshrined in agencies’ policies to guide practitioners in reasonable 
conduct. 
This project focuses specifically on U.S. customs authorities governing searches 
under the border search doctrine. Consequently, it examines electronic border searches in 
the context of merchandise. The totality of the border search doctrine is also based on 
immigration inspection authorities like the those found in Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c). This 
legal authority could similarly be used to inform a scope-limited electronic border search 
approach. Because, however, these authorities do not apply universally but only to arriving 
persons of alienage, an analysis as to how this authority might shape the scope of electronic 
border searches lies beyond the bounds of this paper. This paper also does not distinguish 
between the different agencies, officers, and agents who possess border search authority 
nor the differences in specific duties of each. Rather, all are treated under the monolithic 
“customs officers” as defined in the U.S Code. Accordingly, this thesis will not explore 
any differences in duties and agency mission which might influence a scope-limited 
approach. Although the protocols analyzed and explained based on the hybrid-view/scope-
limited approach could provide significant guidance, this work also will not directly 
address the sharing of data garnered during electronic border searches with other law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies. 
F. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I has identified the problem 
confronting the current practice of electronic border searches since Riley. This chapter has 
set forth the research questions this thesis attempts to answer. It has reviewed the literature 
regarding how electronic devices are considered and treated in Fourth Amendment law. 
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This chapter also presented the border search doctrine, its statutes, and case law, including 
how electronic devices and their search at the border were viewed under the doctrine prior 
to Riley. This chapter also set forth how this thesis seeks to answer the twin research 
questions. 
Chapter II analyzes the impact of Riley and conducts a detailed review of the Fourth 
Circuit’s decisions in Kolsuz and Aigbekaen. It examines how other lower courts have split 
the on the question of electronic border searches including the reasonable object and 
manner of such searches. Chapter II discusses the use of forensic tools in electronic border 
searches and analyzes how courts have diverged in their definitions of what constitutes 
reasonable suspicion in the search of electronic devices at the border. Chapter II also 
explores the Riley decision itself and suggests that its applicability to searches of electronic 
devices at the border is extremely limited. 
Chapter III introduces a new perspective for considering electronic devices at the 
border—a hybrid view. A model that attempts to stake out a middle ground between views 
that define electronic devices as entirely containers and those which declare them to be an 
entirely a new kind of property deserving of a special category of rules. In doing so, Chapter 
III first examines other areas of search and seizure law where perspectives akin to the 
hybrid model have evolved to balance significant government interests and important 
privacy concerns. The chapter then looks to existing statutory regimes, like the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act and the Bank Secrecy Act, for support for the hybrid model. 
Chapter III also discusses the benefits of the hybrid model from its neutral treatment of 
different forms of property, the mode in which property transits the border, to its ability to 
adapt to changing privacy attitudes. Also examined is how the problems of bright-line rules 
are avoided by assuming a hybrid perspective of electronic devices at the border. Chapter 
III then closes by discussing how the hybrid model, by viewing electronic devices as both 
containers and novel property, allows for the protection of data that does not implicate 
historic government border interests. Specifically, this chapter explores how the hybrid 
model respects individual privacy interests in such data by treating that data as novel effects 
beyond the reach of suspicion-less searches by customs officers. 
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Chapter IV presents a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach for electronic border 
searches. As part of this presentation, the chapter examines how other scope-limited 
approaches have been implemented for searches where compelling government needs and 
individual liberty collide. Among the areas discussed that involve scope-limited 
approaches are searches of vehicles incident to arrest (SIA-Vs) as well as protective frisks 
and sweeps. Chapter IV then defines the tiered framework of this approach by outlining a 
two-tiered concept for electronic border searches linked to disparate levels of suspicion. In 
discussing the proposed two tiers of electronic border searches the reasonableness of 
forensic searches of electronic devices when customs officers are armed with an increased 
level of suspicion is examined. Chapter IV concludes by demonstrating why reasonable 
suspicion in line with the Supreme Court’s definition in Terry v. Ohio is preferable to other, 
novel definitions justifying second-tier electronic border searches. 
Chapter V discusses how a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited rule maintains the desired 
balance between government interests and personal privacy at the border. It answers the 
question as to whether the practice of searching electronic devices at the border continues 
to be constitutional following the Riley decision. It also answers the question as to how the 
reasonableness of this practice can be maintained in the future in the face of evolving 
technology through the application of a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach. Chapter V 
then provides conceptual guidance for customs officers undertaking electronic border 
searches, in accordance with this approach, as they confront the unique issues that modern 
electronic devices present. 
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II. THE IMPACT OF RILEY ON ELECTRONIC BORDER 
SEARCHES 
Riley v. California did not involve border searches.94 But Riley’s explication of 
privacy issues stemming from searches of modern cellular phones has ignited a debate that 
has spread to the question of electronic border searches. Specifically, Riley presents a 
challenge to the constitutional reasonableness of such searches, without suspicion or 
warrant, even when government interests reign supreme.95 This chapter explores the 
application of Riley’s rationale to electronic border searches in U.S. v. Kolsuz and its 
progeny, U.S. v. Aigbekaen. This chapter then highlights the divergences that have occurred 
between Courts of Appeal in determinations concerning the object and manner of 
electronic border searches as well as disparate definitions of reasonable suspicion. Lastly, 
this chapter more closely examines the Riley decision itself, its nuances and its verbiage, 
and how its categorical rule for SIA searches is distinguishable from electronic border 
searches. Ultimately, this chapter reasons that while Riley does call for a rethinking of 
electronic devices as property, the decision and its rationale should not signal the demise 
of electronic border searches. 
A. APPLYING RILEY’S NOVEL VIEW OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AT 
THE BORDER: U.S. V. KOLSUZ 
In light of Riley, the Fourth Circuit became the first to apply the High Court’s data 
exceptionalist arguments to the border search context.96 In Kolsuz, the court reviewed a 
forensic border search of a smartphone carried by a traveler attempting illegally to export 
firearm components in his checked baggage.97 The court reasoned that the forensic analysis 
of the traveler’s smartphone constituted a deeper invasion of privacy than a manual (user 
 
94 Riley, 573 U.S. 373. 
95 The Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution states, “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
96 “The Border Search Muddle,” 2280–81. 
97 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 138–39. 
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interface) search.98 Often citing Riley, the Kolsuz court rejected the equation of electronic 
devices with other physical containers crossing the border.99 Applying Riley’s reasoning, 
the court fashioned a rule that declared that electronic devices are a different type of 
property and that the information they contain is “uniquely sensitive.”100 Kolsuz, therefore, 
established a tiered standard that requires particularized and individualized suspicion for 
any electronic border search beyond a manual (user interface) search.101 
More broadly, the Kolsuz court wrote that electronic border searches are only 
reasonable if “relevant government interests are present.”102 The court noted that 
reasonableness is a function of the historically recognized purposes and justifications for 
the border search doctrine itself.103 In other words, electronic border searches must be 
undertaken for effecting those over-arching government interests at the border that have 
been defined as protecting national security, preventing the introduction of harmful goods, 
preventing illegal immigration, and generating revenue.104 Thus, electronic border searches 
targeting terrorism, the smuggling of sensitive technology, and the cross-border movement 
of different types of contraband, for example, are constitutionally reasonable. But Kolsuz 
drew a line there.105 The court wrote that electronic border searches conducted for 
“generalized law enforcement purposes” or “combatting crime” would not reasonable 
because they diverge from “the rationale for the border search exception” itself.106 
 
98 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145–46. A manual (user interface) search is a search conducted by hand, without 
the assistance of special computer equipment or programs, to inspect the contents of a device. The customs 
officer during the search can see only the data that are visible to other device users and in the same format 
that other users see the data.  
99 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145–46. 
100 Kolsuz, at 145. 
101 Kolsuz, at 146–47. 
102 Kolsuz, at 142. 
103 Kolsuz, at 143. 
104 Carroll v. United States, 45 S. Ct. 280, 302 (1925); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616; Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537–38. 
105 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 143. 
106 Kolsuz, at 143. 
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Kolsuz’s foremost implication for searches of electronic devices at the border is that 
while they have great latitude, they are not “boundless.”107 While the Kolsuz acknowledged 
all electronic data could be searched at the border, it was the first appellate court to impose 
restrictions related to substantive scope. Constitutional reasonableness then hinges on 
whether the customs officer’s action was tethered to those large categories of sovereign 
interest for which the border search doctrine was originally created to protect. In particular, 
reasonableness depends on “ongoing” and “transnational” threats that trigger the weighty 
interests of the sovereign at the border.108 
Subsequently, in U.S. v. Aigbekaen, a case involving forensic electronic border 
searches grounded on suspicions of domestic human trafficking activity, the Fourth Circuit 
found forensic searches of a laptop and smartphone to be an unreasonable application of 
border authority due to the lack of relation between the suspected offense and the U.S. 
nation-state’s border interests.109 Echoing Kolsuz, the Aigbekaen court stated the border 
search exception, like all other Fourth Amendment exceptions, “should be defined by its 
justifications.”110 Significantly, the court noted it is not the “search’s location [that] is . . . 
dispositive” but “rather, it is the search’s relation to the [g]overnment’s sovereign interests 
that is paramount” (original emphasis).111 In this regard, the Aigbekaen court identified 
only the four very broad categories recited in Kolsuz.112 It did not reach questions of 
standards for manual (user interface) searches, noting that the government lacked a 
particularized, individualized suspicion of an offense that “[bore] some nexus to the border 
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search exception’s purposes.”113 Thus, “no reasonable basis” existed for suspecting the 
trafficking crimes included a “transnational component.”114 
B. CIRCUIT SPLIT EMERGES 
The Kolsuz, and Aigbekaen rulings constituted a significant break with border 
search precedent. Some courts have refused to go along in this direction based on border 
search supremacy arguments, some of which are enunciated in Supreme Court precedent, 
tethered to statutory regimes both old and new. Other courts have gone further than the 
Kolsuz-Aigbekaen rules to limit the application of the border search doctrine to electronic 
devices, focusing on individual privacy interests rather than earlier decisions or statutory 
history. Still others, unsure of the impact of Riley, have hesitated in making definitive 
declarations. Accordingly, no clear judicial consensus exists as to the reasonableness and 
constitutional permissibility of electronic border searches since Riley. 
Rather, battle lines between competing viewpoints have centered three aspects of 
electronic border searches. First, courts have disagreed on the appropriate objects of 
electronic border searches or exactly what customs officers can search in the data contained 
in an electronic device. Second, courts do not agree on manner of search; specifically, the 
circuits diverge in their conclusions as to the reasonableness of manual (user interface) 
electronic border searches and forensic electronic border searches. Third, courts have 
articulated different definitions of “reasonable suspicion” in their electronic border search 
discussions. This section covers these areas and the divergent arguments about them in 
their turn. 
1. The Object of Electronic Border Searches 
The border search statutes authorizing customs searches are well-established and 
exceedingly broad. No property has ever been legislatively placed beyond the bounds of a 
lawful border search. The Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the plenary nature of 
the doctrine in that all that crosses the border, regardless of its character, is subject to 
 
113 Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 721. 
114 Aigbekaen, at 721. 
23 
search.115 Thus, historically, only one requirement emerged from this legal foundation for 
border searches to be reasonable: merchandise—”goods, wares, and chattels of every 
description.”116 Specifically, either the object of the search is merchandise or the object 
may contain merchandise or evidence of it.117 
Given that searches for merchandise at the border have long been defined as 
encompassing all manner of property encountered there as subject to unbridled search, 
some courts have refused to follow the rationale of Kolsuz and Aigbekaen. The Eleventh 
Circuit in particular has found that electronic devices are merchandise and capable of 
containing merchandise, like all other items of property, and that customs officers have the 
prerogative to search them and the data they contain. In so finding, that circuit has reasoned 
simply that electronic border searches “are not embraced within the prohibition of the 
Fourth Amendment.”118 Rather, that circuit has held—even after Riley and Kolsuz—that 
any type of property can be searched at the border “simply by virtue of the fact that [the 
search] occur[s] at the border.”119 
Other courts have gone further than Kolsuz and Aigbekaen and taken a much 
narrower view as to when electronic devices and their data can be considered merchandise 
thereby subjecting them to reasonable search by customs officers. In 2019, for example, in 
U.S. v. Cano, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, a three-judge panel ruled that 
electronic border searches had to be restricted only to the discovery of digital contraband; 
i.e., child pornography.120 According to the court, denying the entry of digital contraband 
was the only rationale underlying customs authority at the border allowing for the search 
of a traveler’s devices and data.121 This narrow view is without foundation in previous 
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border search case law or statute. The decision also ignored the statutorily established 
definition of merchandise which includes not just contraband but all other “goods, wares, 
and chattels.”122 
Still another court, two months after the Cano decision—hearing a civil case 
involving multiple plaintiffs suing the Department of Homeland Security and separate 
agencies with customs authority—adopted the most restrictive interpretation as to what 
customs officers may search for within electronic devices at the border.123 In Alasaad v. 
McAleenan (aka Alasaad v. Nielsen), the district judge ruled that customs officers’ 
suspicion-less electronic border searches must be restricted to turning on electronic devices 
and verifying that the devices contain data.124 From there, according to the court, additional 
suspicion was necessary to search the data.125 Except for digital items related to depictions 
of child pornography, these decisions flatly deny that electronic devices and data fall within 
the broad definition of merchandise. They distinguish all data from the large swaths of 
other, physical forms of merchandise based on form alone, ignoring substance. 
Accordingly, these decisions stand in direct conflict with other appellate case law.126 In the 
end, these decisions symbolize, and contribute to, the current judicial disarray surrounding 
the object of permissible electronic border searches. 
2. Manner of Search: Manual (User Interface) vs. Forensic Searches 
The rift in the judiciary concerning electronic border searches has widened based 
on the manner of search as well. Before Riley, most courts accepted that any 
non-destructive searches of electronic devices and data at the border were reasonable no 
matter how they were conducted.127 Since Riley, however, courts now disagree as to the 
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circumstances under which a user interface or forensic electronic border search may be 
conducted. 
a. What Is a Forensic Search? 
While a user-interface search involves only a search of a device’s data using the 
human eye, with a customs officer interacting with the device as would any user, a forensic 
search of an electronic device involves the use of special computer programs. Computer 
programs like Cellebrite, Encase, the Forensic Tool Kit and others allow for the creation 
of a “bitstream” copy of all of the data contained on a particular device, also known as the 
target device.128 Making a bitstream copy involves more than just copying files.129 These 
specialized forensic software applications allow for the copying of every byte of memory 
from a target device.130 This includes data that can be seen and accessed by a user of the 
target device as well as data that is otherwise not visible to a user, like deleted files and 
metadata.131 During the forensic process, this bitstream copy of data on a target device is 
transferred to another device under the control of the forensic examiner.132 As the bitstream 
copy is created, it mirrors how the copied data is stored on the target device itself.133 In this 
manner, the forensic search process prevents any alteration to the original data and the 
bitstream copy once made.134 Accordingly, any future manipulations; i.e., search, of the 
copied data cannot alter either that copy or the original data. 
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The use of forensic tools vastly enhances the thoroughness of an electronic device 
search.135 Through this forensic process, government searches are more thorough and 
effective as they counter attempts to hide or erase evidence of crime, a capability that is 
constantly being afforded by the evolving technology behind modern electronic devices.136 
They can reveal files a user deleted and attempted to remove from a device’s memory.137 
This search technique, however, also allows for searches of data that a user may be unaware 
his device is creating and storing.138 Therefore, searches with forensic tools widen the 
physical scope of electronic device searches. A scope that is much broader than mere user-
interface searches. 
b. The Courts and Forensic Electronic Border Searches 
Because of the enhanced search capabilities afforded by forensic software tools, 
some courts have crafted a reasonable suspicion standard for forensic electronic border 
searches.139 Meanwhile, others have maintained that non-destructive searches of property 
at the border never require any amount of suspicion, no matter how they are conducted.140 
In particular, Kolsuz and Aigbekaen have kept to the suspicion-less rule for border searches 
involving a customs officer’s visual inspection of data present on a traveler’s electronic 
device. With respect to forensic searches, however, these courts have found that something 
more than zero suspicion is required. They have justified the higher standard for forensic 
searches due to their vast ability to increase the thoroughness of data searches.141 Such 
searches capture more information including data of which that the traveler may be 
unaware or material that the user has sought to remove from a device.142 
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Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit, has repeatedly affirmed that a border search of 
an electronic device requires no additional suspicion, manual or otherwise. In U.S. v. 
Vergara, for example, after evaluating the impact of Riley, it rejected the application of a 
higher standard in forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.143 Specifically, the 
Vergara court wrote “searches at the border, ‘from before the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment,’ have been considered reasonable by the single fact that the person or item 
in question had entered into our country from the outside” (emphasis added).144 The 
Vergara court invoked Riley’s clear edict limiting that holding solely to the province of 
SIA jurisprudence.145 The court also cited Riley’s plain language that a cellular phone may 
still be searched pursuant to other recognized constitutional exceptions.146 Whether 
electronic border searches are manual or forensic, in Vergara, was immaterial. 
Less than 20 days following the opinion in Kolsuz, the Eleventh Circuit re-affirmed 
its decision in Vergara.147 In Touset v. United States, the court stated pointedly “Property 
and persons are different.”148 According to the decision, “dignity and privacy interests,” in 
the context of border searches, are only of concern when discussing “highly intrusive 
searches of the person.”149 Still the Touset opinion intoned that “import restrictions and 
searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and 
different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.”150 Touset concluded that 
regardless of the method used to search personal property, any non-destructive search of 
property at the border can be done without any degree of suspicion.151 
Still other circuits have refused to align definitively with either the Kolsuz-
Aigbekaen or Vergara-Touset view. In U.S. v. Molina-Isidoro, the Fifth Circuit avoided an 
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analysis of the reasonableness of user-interface and forensic electronic border searches and, 
accordingly, did not opine on a tiered approach to electronic border searches.152 In noting 
the paucity of federal cases involving electronic border searches where some level of 
increased suspicion was required the court revealed its uncertainty in the application of 
such a requirement.153 Then in March 2019, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in U.S. 
v. Wanjiku, followed a similar analytical path.154 There, in reviewing the reasonableness of 
a forensic electronic border search, the court ruled that border search precedent confined 
the requirement for reasonable suspicion only to highly invasive searches.155 The court 
specifically noted that the Supreme Court defined such searches as only those as related to 
“a person’s most intimate body parts.”156 The court, however, did not expand the 
comparative analysis of user-interface and forensic electronic border searches for the 
purposes of articulating relative standards of suspicion required for each.157 In November 
2019, in U.S. v. Williams, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly confronted the 
question of forensic electronic border searches.158 Following the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits, the court declined to find that reasonable suspicion was required to search 
“personal electronic devices at the border.”159 In particular, the court rendered no opinion 
on the bifurcated standard for user interface versus forensic electronic border searches 
adopted post-Riley by Kolsuz. Indeed, it avoided setting a standard altogether. 
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3. Lack of Clarity in “Reasonable Suspicion” Standard 
Before questions of electronic border searches arose, the reasonable suspicion 
standard was only applied to searches of property when the search was destructive.160 
Reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment has generally been defined as 
particularized facts and circumstances indicating that “criminal activity [is] afoot.”161 This 
formulation is known as the Terry standard.162 It applies within the borders of the United 
States to broaden law enforcement officers’ ability to conduct limited searches and seizures 
when government law enforcement and safety interests are sufficient to justify some 
restriction on personal liberty.163 Traditionally, the Terry standard had been reserved for 
highly invasive personal searches; i.e., strip or body cavity searches. By contrast all other 
border searches that were not dangerous, degrading, or damaging did not require the 
application of Terry to establish their reasonableness. Notably, no court has said that such 
warrantless, executive action by customs officers, supported by reasonable suspicion, at 
the border is unreasonable. To the contrary, the Supreme Court itself has stated that such 
border search activity is reasonable with far less than probable cause because of, among 
other things, the “the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of 
illicit narcotics.”164 
After Riley, Kolsuz turned to the reasonable suspicion standard as the hurdle that 
customs officers had to clear in order to conduct forensic border searches. Specifically, 
Kolsuz returned to Terry’s “particularized” and “individualized” elements of the reasonable 
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suspicion analysis.165 This paradigm was touted by several electronic border search 
observers even before Riley. But to Kolsuz, defining reasonable suspicion in the context of 
electronic border searches required that the suspicion be tethered to the justifications of the 
doctrine itself; in this case to thwart “ongoing transnational crime.”166 In doing so, it 
tightened the reasonable suspicion standard beyond Terry. 
Since Kolsuz, several circuits that encountered the question of electronic border 
searches—and specifically, of forensic electronic border searches—have side-stepped or 
refused to delineate a detailed standard.167 Instead, these courts have simply held that, 
however reasonable suspicion is defined, customs officers involved in the searches had the 
necessary suspicion to undertake reasonable forensic electronic border searches.168 
Any understanding of what constitutes reasonable suspicion in the electronic border 
search context was thrown into further disarray with the Ninth Circuit’s Cano decision. 
The court there found unreasonable the electronic border search of a cellular phone 
belonging to a traveler discovered to be attempting to smuggle 14 kilograms of cocaine in 
his vehicle.169 Under other precedents, including Kolsuz, the discovery of the contraband 
merchandise would have constituted reasonable suspicion sufficient for a search of the 
phone, forensic or otherwise.170 But the Cano court instead fashioned a new definition of 
what reasonable suspicion entails for border searches of electronic devices and data. 
Specifically, the court stated that reasonable suspicion in the context of an electronic border 
search was not linked to criminal activity but rather to a particularized, individualized 
suspicion that digital contraband was present on the device to be searched.171 Shortly 
thereafter, the district court in Alasaad echoed the Cano’s rationale in finding that 
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reasonable suspicion justifying an electronic border search should be limited to digital 
contraband only.172 Despite the broad historical justifications of the border search doctrine 
acknowledged in Kolsuz, these two decisions, set a truncated standard. One unconnected 
to existing statutes and caselaw and one that runs counter to statutory construction and 
repeated judiciary analysis; none of which has ever restricted reasonable suspicion searches 
at the border to only those related to contraband. To borrow from the writings of Judge 
Wilkinson in the Kolsuz decision, both cases “[build] a doctrinal house without 
foundation.”173 
C. DISTINGUISHING RILEY IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC 
BORDER SEARCHES 
Observers, like Laura Donohue, have argued that Riley rejects suspicion-less, 
warrantless electronic border searches of any kind as reasonable.174 For multiple reasons, 
however, a wider application of that decision’s rationale to the search of electronic devices 
pursuant to the border search doctrine is unsupportable. For one, border searches are an 
exemption to the Fourth Amendment, not an exception like SIA searches. In 2020, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals flatly stated that framing the border search doctrine as a mere 
exception is “an imperfect locution.”175 The court stated that categorizing the doctrine as 
an exception was erroneous as such terminology suggested it was “carved out from the 
Fourth Amendment’s application.”176 Given the coetaneous birth of the doctrine and the 
Fourth Amendment, the court more accurately described searches at the border as 
“circumstance[s] in which the Fourth Amendment was never intended to apply.”177 Riley’s 
decision then to prevent the search of a cell phone under one Fourth Amendment exception 
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within the borders of the United States has no bearing on the government’s search of a cell 
phone, or any electronic device, at the border. 
Furthermore, in addition to its long-established nature, the border search doctrine 
has a significant statutory basis. SIA searches have none. This fact was recognized by the 
Chief Justice in Riley when he declined to find electronic devices within the scope of SIA 
searches in the absence of any “precise guidance from the founding era.”178 With respect 
to the border search doctrine and electronic devices, there is both historical guidance and 
recent statutory support for electronic border searches. In the 21st century, Congress has 
explicitly contemplated and sanctioned the practice.179 
Another significant factor limiting Riley’s application to electronic border search 
practice is the Court’s plain language. While the Court disallowed SIA searches of 
electronic devices because the rationales supporting the SIA doctrine did not have “much 
force with respect to digital content on cell phones” if affirmatively restricted the breadth 
of its ruling.180 In explicitly confining its holding to SIA searches, the Riley Court 
acknowledged that “other . . . exceptions may still justify” warrantless searches of 
electronic devices, including a cell phone.181 
Further distinguishing Riley from the border search doctrine is the Court’s certiorari 
decisions. The Court declined to hear an electronic border search case involving the same 
concerns related to warrantless searches of personal electronic devices and data, petitioned 
for certiorari at the same time as Riley.182 In other words, the Court had the opportunity to 
limit the application of the border search doctrine to this type of property and advance the 
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same “data exceptionalism” rationale.183 But it declined to do so. Thus, while not explicitly 
exempting electronic border searches from scrutiny, the Court’s strict limitations on the 
Riley holding, its reference to other exceptions allowing warrantless searches of electronic 
devices, and its certiorari choices strongly suggest that the Court meant to leave the border 
search doctrine, as applied to electronic devices, unchanged. 
Furthermore, as much as Riley can be seen as a new paradigm for considering 
electronic devices as property, there is equal weight to the idea that Riley is about 
recalibrating SIA search doctrine to prevent the exception from becoming a loophole 
allowing warrantless “fishing expeditions.”184 Problems in reconciling SIA searches with 
the Fourth Amendment arose long before electronic devices, and SIA case law has evolved 
in fits and starts, sometimes with significant logical inconsistencies. 185 SIA searches have 
come to be accepted as allowing, “categorical[ly],” broad, general searches, without 
additional suspicion, for evidence of any crime.186 Consequently, SIAs have become a 
warrantless “evidence-gathering technique” that effectively grants arresting officers a 
general search license because an officer need not have a “factual basis for believing” what 
type of evidence may be present.187 Far from paralleling other constitutionally accepted 
warrantless search practices in the nation’s interior, SIAs act, in important respects, not in 
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concert but in opposition to the Fourth Amendment and its requirements of specificity. A 
doctrinal problem exacerbated by the development of modern electronic devices.188 
Issues surrounding cloud data storage were another concern of the Riley Court. The 
remote data access and storage capabilities of modern smartphones and applications 
troubled the Court if digital SIAs were to be allowed.189 The Court feared digital SIAs 
could intrude onto data not present on a device and far exceed the scope of what can 
reasonably be searched in conjunction with an arrest.190 The possibility of a search 
extending into property, even intangible data, far away from the location of arrest is 
anathema to the SIA doctrine. These concerns over unbounded intrusions into a person’s 
digital life helped fuel the Court’s ultimate prohibition of digital SIAs.191 This danger, 
however, can be easily controlled in the border context. Users can isolate their devices from 
any cellular or wireless networks prior to inspection. The removal of this connectivity 
effectively prevents border search from extending into off-device data. It confines the 
border search to devices and their data that physically cross the border. 
One other key difference between SIA searches and border searches is the number 
of practitioners authorized to exercise such extra-warrant search authority.192 SIA searches 
can be conducted by any federal, state, or local government official with the power to 
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undertake custodial arrests—a potentially huge pool of practitioners.193 Attendant with 
these numbers is a large capacity for variances in the scope and conduct of SIA searches 
from case to case. Concerns regarding practice variances that include the potential for 
unreasonable search activity by practitioners is greatly lessened with border searches. Only 
federal government officials statutorily identified as customs officers have such 
authority.194 Customs officers are present in only a few government agencies.195 Thus, just 
as the area in which border search authority may be exercised is finite, so too are those 
empowered to effect such searches. The discreet number of insular practitioners decreases 
the chances of wide vagaries in application. Border searches then have the capacity to be 
more uniform and their reasonable conduct easier to delineate and discern.196 
D. CONCLUSION 
Riley has greatly upset the landscape where border searches of all property, 
including electronic devices, were once rarely questioned. The adoption of Riley’s rationale 
by Kolsuz and Aigbekaen, included a re-examination of the reasonableness of border 
searches of modern electronic devices in light of the rationale behind the government’s 
broad authority at the border. But as part of this re-examination of border search authority 
across the judiciary since Riley, courts around the country have fundamentally disagreed 
as to how the doctrine reasonably applies to digital property and data. This disagreement 
involves divergent views as to what are the appropriate objects of electronic border 
searches. It also involves different views as to the manner in which electronic border 
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searches may be conducted; specifically, when such searches must be limited only to 
manual, user-interface searches and when customs officers may use forensic tools. There 
is so little consensus that across the judiciary several divergent definitions of what 
constitutes reasonable suspicion in the context of electronic border searches have been 
advanced. Despite the upheaval it has caused, however, a closer, detailed examination of 
Riley reveals that applying its rhetoric to the border search context is misguided because of 
the unique nature of the border search doctrine itself. Riley’s categorical approach to 
electronic devices in the interior is simply the wrong way to assess the continued 
constitutionality of electronic border searches and determine their reasonableness moving 
forward. 
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III. ELECTRONIC DEVICES AS HYBRID PROPERTY AT THE 
BORDER 
Amid the dueling border search and data supremacy arguments that have 
characterized the post-Riley electronic border search debate, this chapter attempts to 
synthesize a middle ground. It presents a new perspective for electronic devices at the 
border: a hybrid view. The term “hybrid” is not explicitly used in search and seizure law 
but it is present by implication. That is to say, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does 
recognize that certain property and situations have an inherent duality when government 
stakes and privacy stakes are simultaneously high.197 In such instances, rigid application of 
bright-line Fourth Amendment rules tenets does not adequately serve the two. In short, a 
middle ground between plenary warrant requirements and blanket exceptions is necessary. 
This middle ground is often found when courts or legislatures tailor traditional principles 
to situations where the duality exists.198 
A hybrid view or model of electronic devices at the border is a middle perspective 
because it avoids a view of electronic devices as entirely a container where all electronic 
data is considered a personal chattel (like a suitcase), subject to suspicion-less government 
review at the border. It also, however, refuses to view electronic devices as an entirely 
special class of property where even at the border the government has little authority to 
intrude. Instead, the hybrid perspective here accounts for the dual nature of electronic 
devices. It understands that electronic devices do contain data that is highly relevant to 
government interests at the border and substantively akin to physical property for which 
government border search authority is unquestioned. At the same time, however, the hybrid 
perspective accommodates the view that some data held in modern electronic devices is so 
unique, so personal, and so divergent from the border search rationale that it deserves 
protection from suspicion-less search. 
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This chapter defines which digital content would be subject to a suspicion-less 
border search under a hybrid view of electronic devices. Then it elaborates on support for 
the hybrid view from situations were tailored rules have developed to deal with new 
technology or situations where the tension between personal privacy and legitimate 
government interests is high. This elaboration includes a discussion of the law involving 
motor vehicle searches, legislative enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, including language embedded Title III provisions, and the Bank Secrecy Act. All of 
these areas are similar to electronic border searches because while the personal privacy 
rights involved are significant the law has been tailored to accommodate extremely 
important government needs. 
An examination of the benefits of a hybrid model for electronic devices follows, as 
well as a discussion concerning how a hybrid approach avoids problems created by 
categorical, bright-line rules. This chapter then closes by looking at specific items of 
modern electronic data that would be beyond the bounds of a suspicion-less border search 
under a hybrid view of electronic devices. In doing so, the chapter conceptualizes certain 
unique data as an “effect” and presents reasons for granting such data enhanced 
protection.199 
A. DEFINING THE HYBRID VIEW: ELECTRONIC DEVICES AND THE 
BORDER 
The hybrid view of electronic devices looks at their digital contents. First, it 
compares items of intangible data to traditional property. If an item of electronic data 
directly parallels tangible, physical property that is subject to search at the border, then the 
hybrid model holds that the electronic data is subject to suspicion-less border search. This 
would include documents and photographs stored digitally. Both have tangible property 
parallels which are subject to search if transported across the border in physical form. 
Second, if no traditional property parallel exists, the hybrid model assesses electronic data 
substantively. Specifically, it examines whether the nature of the data intersects the broad 
interests of the government at the border as they were defined in Kolsuz and Aigbekaen. 
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An example of this would be recent call logs which do not have a directly comparable 
traditional property analog. Call logs, however, do reveal efforts to coordinate smuggling 
or trafficking activities. As such, if data does relate to the broad interests of the government 
at the border, regardless of the existence of a real-world comparison, the hybrid perspective 
still holds the data as being subject to a suspicion-less border search. 
The hybrid model maintains consistency in the application of the border search 
doctrine. Data, no matter how new, is reasonably subject to search just like new types of 
physical property would be if they are relevant to recognized government interests at the 
border. The hybrid model, however, protects data that has no traditional property 
counterpart and, because of its nature, does not relate to government search interests at the 
border. An example of this type of data is stored internet search histories. Not only do 
digitally stored internet search histories not have a traditional property parallel, those 
records, on their face, are not capable of revealing information pertaining to such matters 
as national security, smuggling, or illegal immigration. Consequently, with respect to such 
novel data, the hybrid model precludes suspicion-less searches of that data by customs 
officers. 
The hybrid model recognizes the significant legal basis authorizing the government 
to search for merchandise crossing the border.200 It provides for the application of existing 
rules for searching merchandise in modern form. For instance, if a traveler carries a hard-
bound book across the border, the volume would be subject to inspection by customs 
officers. Technically speaking, the book is merchandise. If instead of carrying the book in 
paper form a traveler carries its e-book counterpart across the border in a laptop computer 
or e-reader, the hybrid model provides for the reasonable search of that e-book. The text of 
book, regardless of form, is merchandise and subject to the same inspection because the 
content is the same. 
The hybrid model for electronic devices at the border also accounts for the 
reasonable search of data that has no physical counterpart but that is still highly relevant to 
government interests. Text messages have no direct physical property parallel but can 
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contain evidence of merchandise being moved across the U.S. border or be relevant to 
matters of national security.201 Thus, the hybrid model too allows for their reasonable, 
suspicion-less search by customs officers at the border. By contrast, data generated by a 
smartphone application or a wearable fitness device, like a “fit-bit,” that monitors a 
traveler’s physical activity and some aspects of personal physiology have no real-world 
property comparison.202 Moreover, such data does not touch on relevant government 
concerns. Under the hybrid model, customs officers would be precluded from conducting 
a suspicion-less border search of this data. 
Importantly, the hybrid model is balanced. Just because a large amount of electronic 
data is subject to suspicion-less border searches does not mean that the government can 
search all data. The adoption of hybrid view of electronic devices allowing for the 
application of traditional search and seizure rules is not new. Such a model has basis in 
rules tailored to address other technological developments like those developed to define 
reasonable searches of motor vehicles. 
B. CASE LAW SUPPORT FOR HYBRID APPROACH: THE CARROLL 
DOCTRINE 
The mobile conveyance exception to the Fourth Amendment, first enunciated in 
Carroll is a hybrid property approach.203 The Carroll Doctrine treats vehicles as hybrid 
property; that is property in which people have significant privacy interests but in which 
the government has concomitant interests that cannot be satisfied through rigid application 
of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant tenet.204 On the one hand, vehicles are personal effects 
and can hold highly personal highly personal property.205 On the other hand, vehicles can 
rapidly and readily move thereby defeating the government’s ability to affect searches with 
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a warrant. Vehicles can simply move across jurisdictions too quickly, outpacing the 
government’s ability to obtain and serve a search warrant. 
In addition to being a container, vehicles are also instrumentalities. Vehicles 
provided a new means for committing crimes. They are capable of both concealing and 
smuggling goods while also enabling individuals to commit crimes and escape the scene 
of those crimes.206 The hybrid approach to motor vehicles, one that tailors established 
search and seizure precepts, is justified by the fact that vehicles are subject to larger levels 
of government control.207 Specifically, the government can tax them, regulate their use on 
public roads, require registration, and also restrict how their owners may use them.208 In 
short, the government has compelling interests in effecting searches of vehicles distinct 
from other property. But because of their unique characteristics, specifically their ability 
to defeat searches with a warrant, the Supreme Court in Carroll recognized the need to 
adapt traditional principles to searches of vehicles. To accommodate for the unique 
characteristics of vehicles, the Court tailored existing Fourth Amendment search rules by 
alleviating the problem of delays caused by the need for law enforcement to secure a 
warrant before conducting a search of a vehicle.209 Instead, Carroll empowered law 
enforcement, armed with probable cause, to immediately proceed with a vehicle search 
without the possibility of losing that ability to search while awaiting a warrant.210 The result 
is that the reasonableness of vehicle searches under Carroll are based only on the object of 
their search—namely, evidence of crime.211 Carroll’s formulation then is an example of a 
tailored application of existing Fourth Amendment rules to account for the novel 
characteristics of what, nearly a century ago, was a new technology.212 
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The development of the Carroll doctrine is instructive in an analysis of electronic 
border searches in that vehicles were a revolutionary innovation in property that challenged 
existing constitutional precepts in many of the same ways modern electronic devices do.213 
Like motor vehicles, electronic devices too are readily mobile. They act as both containers 
and instrumentalities. They carry with them significant privacy interests. At the border, 
however, they and their data can implicate the same government regulatory interests as 
traditional property.214 In assuming a hybrid perspective, like that implicitly used for motor 
vehicles, the quantity or private nature of the information electronic devices is not 
dispositive. Rather, as under Carroll, viewing electronic devices at the border as hybrid 
property ties the reasonableness of an electronic border search to the object of and rationale 
for the search. 
C. OTHER STATUTORY SUPPORT FOR THE HYBRID MODEL 
Electronic border searches under the hybrid model can intrude into digital privacy 
and, specifically, electronic communications, but this eventuality does not render searches 
consistent with the model unreasonable. Critics like Laura Donohue argue that the scope 
of electronic border searches need be truncated to protect electronic communications.215 
She compares electronic messages to postal mail and, in doing so, relies exclusively on 
restrictions to the examination of outbound mail in the custody of the U.S. Postal 
Service.216 This rationale, however, ignores explicit and implicit statutory support for 
border searches encompassing communications, no matter the form in which they are 
carried. Specifically, border searches of inbound U.S. Mail, including correspondence, can 
be conducted by customs officers without restriction when they are suspected of containing 
or related to merchandise.217 Moreover, correspondence carried in or out of the country by 
a traveler or private courier service, is not part of the mails, and is fully subject to suspicion-
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less examination by customs officers.218 In addition, any argument seeking additional 
protections at the border for written communications, whether in physical or digital form, 
ignores the fact that searches of “envelopes” are specifically authorized at the border.219 
Apart from these border rules, further support for electronic communications, like other 
private data, being subject to electronic border searches, even under a hybrid view, can be 
gleaned from other statutory regimes. 
1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Congress has recognized through its passage of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA), the need for a middle ground to ensure the government has access to 
important evidence contained within new communications technology. The result is 
significantly diminished privacy protections for electronic communications (i.e., digital 
communications). 220 The ECPA allows for different ways in which the government may 
access stored electronic communications under given circumstances and that access does 
not in all cases require the protection of a search warrant.221 While stored electronic 
communications held in a provider’s electronic storage for less than 180 days require the 
government to obtain a warrant to search, such communications stored for 180 days or 
more do not.222 In fact, such communications may be obtained by law enforcement with 
only a subpoena.223 Transactional information, including identifying data of others with 
whom a particular subscriber has communicated, only requires a showing that such 
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information is “reasonable and material.”224 And even when a search warrant is needed, an 
ECPA warrant does not require the same intensive benchmarks as an order authorizing 
interception of spoken communications or even the live time interception of transcribed 
communications.225 Even in the interior electronic communications only receive limited 
protection. The ECPA then, by its very construction, contradicts arguments that electronic 
communications should be granted elevated protection.226 
The real-time communication monitoring provisions of the ECPA (often referred 
to a Title III) also serve as an important guidepost for the reasonableness of searching 
electronic communications during electronic border searches. These provisions set 
protection for electronic communications “at the Fourth Amendment standard of 
protection, rather than the additional level given . . . to oral and wire communications.”227 
In fact, Congress explicitly provided in its legal formulation that electronic 
communications as a class are subject to the normal reasonableness and warrant rules 
developed under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.228 For instance, electronic 
communications do not receive the protection of real-time minimization like oral and wire 
communications do.229 Thus, per statute, electronic communications do not receive special 
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protection and are like traditional property in assessing Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.230 
2. Bank Secrecy Act 
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) is another statutory regime where, without much 
controversy, personal privacy interests, including those at the border, are explicitly and 
significantly diminished. Under the BSA, they are explicitly placed secondary to the 
government’s interest in promoting the nation’s security through greater power to counter 
currency generating threats, both foreign and domestic. Specifically, the BSA allows for 
government oversight of highly private currency transactions. The BSA does this through 
numerous reporting requirements including the “Report of International Transportation of 
Currency or Monetary Instruments.”231 This legislative requirement is a border search 
statute that mandates that any person who, among other things, “physical[ly] transports . . . 
currency . . . in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 into or out of the United States” 
files such a report.232 It empowers customs officers to oversee what is being moved in and 
out of the country thereby enhancing border and national security. 
Other BSA provisions also significantly enhance government authority at the 
expense of personal privacy. Specifically, the BSA requires all financial institutions to 
document qualifying currency transactions occurring within the United States and furnish 
the government with those records.233 These provisions also require financial institutions 
to document any suspicious transactions.234 Thus, despite the highly private nature of a 
person’s currency and banking transactions the regulatory scheme adopted by Congress 
 
230 See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c) (2010), specifically about limiting judicial sanctions and 
remedies relative to the interception of electronic communications. 
231 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering: 
Comptroller’s Handbook (Washington, DC: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2000), 1, 7. The 
BSA is also known as the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. 
232 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2011). 
233 “Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) & Related Regulations,” Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
March 25, 2019, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/bsa-related-
regulations/index-bsa-and-related-regulations.html. See also 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.300–1010.370 (2011). 
234 “Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR),” Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, March 4, 2019, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bank-operations/financial-crime/suspicious-
activity-reports/index-suspicious-activity-reports.html. See also 31 C.F.R. § 1010.320. 
46 
allows the government to intrude significantly into the financial lives of individuals, within 
the United States, without the need for a warrant.235 The legislatively created dynamic of 
the BSA that promotes government interests over those of the individual for sovereign 
security reasons is analogous to the border where significant invasions of privacy have too 
been recognized by statute. Unlike the BSA, however, the hybrid model for electronic 
devices and data at the border does allow for some restraints on government authority 
which afford some degree of privacy in a traveler’s digital life. 
D. BENEFITS OF HYBRID PROPERTY VIEW OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
There are two important benefits to the adoption of a hybrid property perspective 
for electronic devices in the context of electronic border searches. The hybrid view 
provides a mechanism for mitigating the problem for border searches created in the wake 
of Riley; that is the creation of different rules for different forms of property. The hybrid 
view does not grant greater or lesser protection based typological property differences. It 
also does not bestow immunity from search based on the method in which the property 
item physically crosses the border. It is neutral in both respects. A second benefit from the 
hybrid model is that it provides for a measured approach preventing the government from 
rummaging through the entirety of a traveler’s digital existence and history. As such, the 
model has the ability to adapt to changing privacy conceptions as well. The following 
sections discuss the hybrid model’s favorability for its neutral rules and its fluidity to meet 
changing privacy attitudes. 
1. Technological and Travel Mode Neutrality 
Technological neutrality is important in maintaining consistency in search and 
seizure law and the border search doctrine. Noted Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr 
has written that the constitutional balance struck in the physical world should be the same 
balance that is struck in the digital world.236 Richard McAdams has argued that creating 
one set of rules for digital property and another for traditional property is a faulty 
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approach.237 The creation of separate rules is another reason why, according to McAdams, 
Riley’s categorical approach to electronic devices is problematic as it widened “the gap 
between digital and ‘analogue’ searches.”238 Other Fourth Amendment scholars, like 
Thomas Clancy, have cautioned that creating a special property category with special rules 
for electronic devices threatens to create a two-track Fourth Amendment, one track for 
digital property and another track for all other property.239 This could lead to the creation 
of ad hoc rules resulting in “stark” differences in how digital and traditional property are 
treated under the law, when in substance each are quite similar.240 
At the border, technological neutrality is necessary to preserve the established 
dynamic granting the government broad search authority to protect the nation and people 
from harm. It is illogical to grant travelers increased levels of privacy simply by virtue of 
carrying their property in digital versus physical form.241 When electronic devices act as 
containers holding in their memory an item that has a direct physical counterpart, no 
distinctions should be made. These items should be subject to examination at ports of entry 
and exit just as a tangible object. Some court’s like Cano, in their haste to adopt Riley, 
violate the principle of technological neutrality. So unmoored from this principle was the 
Cano court that it sua sponte abrogated nearly all of Congress’s definition of merchandise 
without even mentioning that statute let alone declaring it unconstitutional. It, in effect, 
created a special per se warrant rule only applicable to electronic devices at the border, and 
a child pornography exception to that warrant requirement. Decisions like that of Cano, 
and others, depict judges, creating special rules for digital property far adrift from accepted 
principle, “in over [their] heads,” and ignorant of the dangers the border search doctrine 
has been established to counter.242 
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A hybrid view of electronic devices is valuable because it avoids separate 
categorical rules for different types of property. This view does not elevate form over 
substance in a manner that would render the government’s border search authority 
“meaningless.”243 The hybrid view of electronic devices at the border refuses to exempt 
property from search only because of the form in which it is carried. The hybrid model 
preserves the cogency of border search rules by maintaining the desired balance between 
the government and individual at the border—that all property is subject to search—which 
should remain unchanged by the arrival of new technology.244 The hybrid model is 
technologically neutral. It allows the government the same exercise of its long-standing 
sovereign right to interdict and uncover illicit cross-border activity no matter whether that 
activity is enabled by digital technology or not. 
Mode of transportation neutrality is important as well. Whether an item is carried 
across the border on a traveler’s person or transits the border by other means, the border 
search doctrine is agnostic. The Ramsey Court was clear on this point when it wrote “that 
there is nothing in the rationale behind the border-search exception which suggests that the 
mode of entry will be critical” (emphasis added).245 The Ramsey Court, in denying any 
distinction between a letter crossing the border in a traveler’s possession vice one sent via 
the mail, noted the “critical fact” to be “not that [envelopes] are brought in by one mode of 
transportation rather than the another.”246 To the Court, “it [was] their entry into [the] 
country from without it that [made] a resulting search ‘reasonable.’”247 Mode neutrality is 
an aspect of the debate universally unaddressed by critics of electronic border searches. 
There is no favored method of import or export in the law. Congress has placed no 
categorical restrictions on searches of “goods, wares, and chattels of every description” 
based upon how property is transported.248 Critics of electronic border searches base their 
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arguments solely on the perspective of a traveler and the personal smartphone or laptop he 
or she may be carrying.249 The logic articulated by the Ramsey Court holds equally true for 
goods that enter the country in the carriage of travelers as those which enter as palletized 
cargo, in express courier parcels, or other unaccompanied shipments. The border search 
doctrine and any rule relative to searches of electronic devices occurring there need to 
encompass all that crosses the border. This neutrality in mode of carriage or transportation 
means that property owners can expect their electronic devices and data to be subject to the 
same search rules whether their device are in their pockets, in their baggage, in their 
vehicle, in an express courier parcel, or in a shipping container. 
2. Privacy Interests and Privacy Attitudes 
Conceptually, assuming a hybrid property perspective for electronic devices and 
their data enables electronic border searches to sustain their reasonableness and adapt to 
changing attitudes toward personal privacy. For instance, observers in the digital age have 
advocated for a shift in thinking about privacy in the Fourth Amendment context.250 Kerr 
advocates that the advancement of technology requires a change in focus from 
“inside/outside distinctions” relative to expectations of privacy to “content/non-content 
distinctions.”251 Authors like David Sklansky, have assumed the view that privacy means 
the ability to seek refuge in a place where the government cannot go.252 Hence, to Sklansky, 
the right to privacy means an ability to retreat into what he terms “zones of refuge.”253 
 
249 See, generally, Donohue, “Customs, Immigration, and Rights”; Upright, “Suspicionless Border 
Seizures of Electronic Files,” 291; Flipse, “An Unbalanced Standard,” 851–74; Matthew B. Kugler, “The 
Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study,” University of 
Chicago Law Review 81, no. 3 (2014): 1165–1211; Alzahabi, “Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home?”; 
Fontecchio, “Suspicionless Laptop Searches,” 266; Coletta, “Laptop Searches at the United States 
Borders”; and Wilson, “Laptops and the Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment.” 
250 See, for example, David A. Sklansky, “Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy 
and the Fourth Amendment,” California Law Review 102, no. 5 (2014): 1069–1121; Pamela Samuelson, 
“Review: A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the Global Information Economy,” 
California Law Review 87, no. 3 (1999): 751–78, https://doi.org/10.2307/3481032; Paul Ohm, “The Fourth 
Amendment in a World without Privacy,” Mississippi Law Journal 81, no. 5 (2012): 1309–56; and Kerr, 
“An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment.” 
251 Kerr, “Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet,” 1017–22. 
252 Sklansky, “Too Much Information,” 1113. 
253 Sklansky, 1115. 
50 
Sklansky advocates for such a paradigm shift to reassess the reasonableness of a variety of 
modern government intrusions including the collection of digital and electronic 
information and even the use of confidential informants. First, the hybrid model for 
electronic devices at the border comports with the essence of Kerr’s argument by focusing 
on substance vice form. Second, even under Sklansky’s alternate, expansive view of 
privacy, however, the hybrid model is both reasonable and sustainable. Third, travelers 
would maintain their “zone of refuge” in data that does not, in its substance, align with 
other property considered merchandise and historically within the sphere of customs 
inspection.254 Furthermore, travelers have the ability to protect their data privacy at the 
border with the evolution in personal electronic devices that has made them more “cloud-
enabled.”255 Using cloud storage and cloud-based applications, travelers can create a “zone 
of refuge” by storing their data off-device.256 Because electronic border searches, as 
advocated in the next chapter, based on the hybrid model can be limited in their scope, both 
physically and in content, travelers can place any data they wish beyond the bounds where 
the government can go at the border. 
E. AVOIDING THE PROBLEM OF BRIGHT-LINE RULES 
A categorical view of electronic devices, either completely in favor of the 
government’s search authority or completely favoring individual privacy, does not promote 
an effective balance. A bright-line, all or nothing, resolution to the electronic border search 
question lacks necessary nuance. On the one hand, a bright-line rule like that of Riley, and 
to a large degree articulated in Cano and Alasaad, could “eviscerate” the border search 
doctrine.257 On the other, a bright-line rule protecting the government’s absolute right to 
search electronic devices despite the growing privacy interests travelers have in certain 
types of data is too rigid. Such a standard would invariably become increasingly brittle and 
unsupportable in the face of ever-evolving technologies. Donald Dripps has recognized the 
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problem with bright-line Fourth Amendment rules.258 While they are determinant and 
provide clear lines to practitioners, they struggle to maintain legitimacy over time.259 Such 
rules lack adaptability to deal with novel factual scenarios presented by such issues like 
those inherent to modern technology. The inflexibility of categorical rules either render 
them obsolete or force them to become untethered from accepted doctrine which triggers 
their perception as increasingly illegitimate. 
An example can be seen in the evolution of searches of vehicles incident to the 
arrest of an occupant (SIA-Vs). Prior to 2009, a bright-line rule for SIA-Vs existed that 
allowed these searches to be conducted after the occupants had been removed from a 
vehicle and their access to its contents significantly impeded. 260 The bright-line rule even 
allowed SIA-Vs to be conducted after an arrested occupant was locked in a law 
enforcement vehicle and even after they were taken from the scene of the arrest. 261 This 
bright-line rule, however, extended far beyond the original rationale for SIA-Vs. This 
unprincipled extension threatened the legitimacy of SIA-Vs. In U.S. v. Gant, the Supreme 
Court, though not using the terminology, returned to a hybrid model consistent with 
Carroll.262 In doing so, it limited the circumstances in which the government can exercise 
SIA-V search authority.263 The Court in Gant eschewed a categorical rule that gave the 
government plenary authority over vehicle while also protecting established government 
interests stemming from the unique technological character of motor vehicles. Thus, 
through a hybrid approach, Gant accounted for concerns on both sides of the categorical 
debate. A hybrid approach to modern electronic devices and their data at the border can 
strike a similar balance, thereby promoting the legitimacy of electronic border searches. 
 
258 Donald A. Dripps, “The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy versus 
Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules,” Mississippi Law Journal 74 (2004): 341–427. 
259 Dripps, 346–47. 
260 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
261 See Arizona. v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341–343 (2009). 
262 Gant, at 343. 
263 Gant, at 343. 
52 
F. NOVEL ELECTRONIC DATA AS PERSONAL “EFFECTS” 
Since the time of the Founding and until relatively recently, “effects” have been 
forgotten aspect of Fourth Amendment law.264 Instead, the focus of many arguments 
against government warrantless property searches (including digital searches) have been 
based on claims that such searches violate personal privacy because they unreasonably 
invade a person’s “papers.”265 The debate over the constitutionality of searches of papers 
has a long history and has occupied judges and scholars alike.266 And some border search 
critics have advanced arguments questioning the reasonableness of electronic border 
searches rooted in the historic protection afforded personal papers.267 Still others have 
examined the reasonableness of customs searches of private papers in light of the history 
of the border search doctrine and have not reached any definitive conclusions.268 But 
relying on arguments that focus on privacy in papers is not helpful in defining a reasonable 
approach to electronic border searches. Papers have long been considered personal 
chattel.269 As a chattel, their search is supported by statute and historically accepted.270 
Moreover, because “papers” in digital form either are directly comparable to or 
substantively parallel physical papers, arguments seeking to curtail electronic border 
search on these grounds are illogical; especially when they are unaccompanied by an 
argument favoring a prohibition on customs searches of physical papers. 
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Conceptualizing certain electronic data that is wholly distinctive in both form and 
substance from other property as a novel “effect” is more useful in the context of ensuring 
reasonable electronic border searches.271 What constitutes a personal effect has not been 
well defined by courts.272 The term, however, has been used to encompass electronic 
devices as personal possessions.273 It should also be used when considering certain types 
of modern data contained in those devices. According to Clancy, effects are personal 
possessions “implicating [a] person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”274 Effects, 
however, do have other definitions. In particular, Black’s Law Dictionary provides a legal 
definition for an “effect” as a noun as “that which is produced by an agent or cause” or a 
“result” or “consequence.”275 Thinking of some electronic data as an effect recognizes that 
modern electronic devices and software applications are personal agents that produce 
information caused by or a consequence of their use. This kind of data; i.e., a novel digital 
effect, is a traveler’s personal possession; one in which privacy is undoubtedly expected 
and that almost invariably has no physical world comparison. In addition, data considered 
an effect under this definition is irrelevant to the government’s core border interests. 
The category of novel digital effects here would include new types of digital 
information like electronic metadata that is created by electronic devices or software 
through their use and operation.276 Also included would be data created as a result of 
modern electronic devices, like smartphones, acting as an agent involved in the monitoring 
of a user’s physical health and activity. Information related to a user’s internet search 
habits, movements, and proclivities would also be considered a novel digital effect. Data 
of this nature can be characterized as digital surveillance data and is created and stored 
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automatically on a device, often in a manner opaque to the user. Digital surveillance data 
is both highly revealing about a person’s life and its creation and storage is frequently 
beyond the user’s control.277 For instance, many modern mobile phone applications 
specifically need to track a user’s movements through a smartphone or other smart device 
in order to afford full functionality.278 Consequently, rather than viewing this data as 
merchandise a traveler voluntarily carries across the border, the hybrid approach views this 
data as novel digital “effects” at the border.279 In doing so, the hybrid perspective protects 
this special category of personal data from suspicion-less government trespass.280 
The hybrid model’s view of certain digital information created by new technology 
as a novel personal effect has received recent implicit support. The term “effect” returned 
to Supreme Court search and seizure jurisprudence in U.S. v. Jones.281 This case centered 
on the use of GPS tracking technology in connection with motor vehicles.282 Data produced 
as a consequence of the use of such technology was recognized by members of the Court 
as revealing significantly detailed information about a person’s movements.283 Though the 
Jones Court did not explicitly define that data produced by GPS vehicle trackers as a 
personal “effect,” the re-introduction of this term in the context of one of the Court’s 
cornerstone decisions concerning new technologies is insightful.284 The insight is 
especially strong considering the implication of data as a personal “effect” in a case where 
many Justices agreed that the data trespass at issue allowed for an unreasonable privacy 
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invasion empowering the government to create a detailed “mosaic” of a person’s life.285 
Support for the idea of modern electronic data as a personal effect grew when the late 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia indicated that such a conceptualization might be a 
way to balance government interests and personal privacy in searches of data.286 By 
viewing certain types of modern electronic data as novel digital effects, the hybrid model 
adapts the Jones “trespass test” to protect specially categorized data at the border.287 
G. CONCLUSION 
Treating electronic devices as hybrid property resolves the increasing tension 
between categorical perspectives in the electronic border search debate. The hybrid model 
takes a balanced view and promotes reasonableness by recognizing that while much 
electronic data should be subject to electronic border searches, special types of modern 
data should not be. Allowing data, directly paralleling tangible property, to be searched 
promotes technological neutrality and consistency in the application of border rules. 
Similarly, allowing the search of data, though entirely novel but still relevant to the issues 
giving rise to the government’s broad border authority, is also legitimate. Such a 
data-centric focus looks at substance vice form. But the hybrid model draws a line. It also 
acknowledges that some data is so novel that it cannot fairly be considered merchandise at 
the border, no matter how broadly that term is defined. Adopting a hybrid approach to 
electronic devices protects the privacy interests of travelers in wholly unique data; those 
novel digital effects for which their substantive search has no precedent and little to do 
with the underlying rationale of the border search doctrine. 
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IV. TIERED, HYBRID-SCOPE-LIMITED ELECTRONIC 
BORDER SEARCHES 
In the context of electronic border searches, a hybrid view of electronic devices 
paves the way for a scope-limited search protocol in keeping with precedents. The hybrid 
view calls for suspicion-less electronic border searches to be limited in scope to the core 
government interests, recognized in Kolsuz and Aigbekaen, underpinning the existence the 
border search doctrine itself. Specifically, scope-limited rules authorize recognize the 
government’s authority to search property but limit the depth and breadth of that search to 
government’s need to conduct that search. Such rules ensure that legitimate government 
interests are protected without personal privacy being eviscerated. Importantly, some 
scope-limited protocols allow for the scope of a search to be expanded when supported by 
greater suspicion or government need. In applying search scope-limitations based on the 
hybrid model, limits on suspicion-less electronic border searches are imposed. This hybrid-
scope-limited approach or framework, as it is termed in this thesis, thus ensures the 
continued constitutionality of border searches of electronic devices undertaken without 
suspicion. This approach also incorporates a second tier of electronic border search where 
the scope and manner of such a search can be expanded but only when triggered by an 
elevated degree of suspicion. The result is a reasonable rule for electronic border searches 
centered on a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach akin, but not identical, to that 
articulated in Kolsuz and Aigbekaen. 
This chapter first explores other areas of Fourth Amendment law where 
scope-limited approaches have been adopted to strike a desired balance between significant 
government interests and personal privacy. An outline of the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited 
framework for electronic border searches follows. Specifically, a two-tiered concept based 
on degrees of suspicion is discussed. An examination of the reasonableness of forensic 
electronic border searches when customs officers possess greater suspicion then follows. 
The chapter closes with an argument as to why the reasonable suspicion standard in the 
context of the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited protocol should follow the constitutionally 
accepted Terry definition of that term. 
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A. OTHER SCOPE-LIMITED APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT 
SEARCHES 
Scope-limited approaches are not new in the Fourth Amendment context. They 
allow for varying levels of government intrusion into private property in the event of an 
overriding government necessity.288 In such cases the, government intrusions are 
reasonable so long as the government tailors its conduct to match the rationale that initially 
justified the intrusion. This tailoring establishes a sliding scale for determining reasonable 
government conduct that expands in keeping with increased justification. 
1. Scope-Limitations in Searches of Vehicles 
Carroll not only articulated a hybrid approach designed to stake out a middle 
ground between the competing interests of the individual and state in the property of motor 
vehicles, but the case also set forth a scope-limited rule for effecting the desired balance of 
those interests. Specifically, the rule limits the breadth and degree of a government search, 
even with probable cause.289 Only those areas may be lawfully searched where the object 
that the government is seeking may reasonably be located in the vehicle.290 In other words, 
although a law enforcement officer might reasonably search a vehicle’s trunk and 
passenger compartment for a shotgun as evidence of a crime, the scope of that reasonable 
search may not necessarily extend to the glove-compartment, the engine block or the gas 
tank. 
Searches of vehicles incident to arrest (SIA-V) under Gant similarly adapt 
traditional rules embodying a scope-limited approach in two ways.291 First, the scope of an 
SIA-V applies only to areas of the vehicle actually and immediately accessible to an 
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arrested occupant.292 This restriction exists because the search is meant to safeguard law 
enforcement and protect against the destruction of evidence.293 Thus, the extent and depth 
of an SIA-V under this rationale depends entirely on facts peculiar to the arrest.294 The 
second aspect of the Gant rule limits a search with probable cause to the crime for which 
the vehicle’s occupant was arrested.295 For example, if a suspect in a vehicle occupant is 
arrested for armed robbery, Gant permits a search of the vehicle for the evidence of the 
robbery only with probable cause to believe that such evidence is actually present in the 
vehicle. This restriction affords the government the ability to recover important evidence 
supporting the guilt of the occupant before the evidence can be moved or lost. But it 
precludes law enforcement from rummaging through a vehicle—a person’s private 
property—to develop evidence of new crimes that are, by definition, outside the scope of 
the search. 
2. Protective Search Activity: Frisks and Sweeps 
Scope-limited approaches have also been adopted to accommodate the dueling 
interests of personal liberty and law enforcement officer safety arising from public 
investigative encounters. For example, protective frisks, under Terry, can be undertaken 
after a law enforcement officer has briefly detained an individual and reasonably suspects, 
based upon articulable facts, that the person is armed and dangerous.296 Such frisks protect 
law enforcement officers from threats to their safety posed by highly concealable weapons. 
297 Even the manner is restricted to support the desired scope-limitation, for example, a pat 
down only with the open palm without a manipulation of objects using the fingers. In this 
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way, the law surrounding frisks contains a search scope-limitation. One that attempts to 
stake out a middle ground measured to protect officer safety while protecting the person 
frisked from embarrassment or undue impingement on personal liberty.298 
A scope-limited approach has also been carved from standing Fourth Amendment 
rules for situations when police are lawfully present in a residence but without a search 
warrant. Any government search of a home without a warrant has long been viewed under 
the Constitution, by the judiciary, with wariness.299 But even in instances when personal 
privacy considerations are at their peak, rules have been tailored to protect competing 
government interests—like the need to protect the safety of law enforcement officials. In 
Maryland v. Buie, the Supreme Court adopted a scope-limited rule allowing a 
non-evidentiary search of a residence incident to a domiciliary arrest.300 This type of search 
is referred to as a protective sweep.301 It is a warrantless search of portions of a residence 
immediately adjacent to the location of arrest for threats to officer safety.302 For example, 
law enforcement officers arresting a subject in a kitchen of a residence may search an 
adjacent first floor living room but not necessarily an upstairs bedroom. Protective sweeps 
are limited both in depth—how far law enforcement officers may intrude into a residence—
and in breadth—that is, the areas intruded must be capable of concealing a threat.303 
Significantly, the Buie rule, like the rule for SIA-V’s, contains a mechanism for the 
scope of a protective sweep to broaden. That mechanism is tied to a reasonable suspicion 
that another person, located elsewhere in the residence, poses a risk to law enforcement.304 
Amid such suspicion, law enforcement may increase the scope of a protective sweep, 
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specifically its depth, to all areas of a residence, including those not immediately adjacent 
to the location of arrest.305 For instance, in arresting a suspect in a residential kitchen, with 
reasonable suspicion, a lawful sweep can extend beyond just an adjacent living room into 
upstairs rooms and any place in a residence where a person may be concealed. In other 
words, with greater suspicion, the greater weight government interests have, the more 
reasonable the scope of the warrantless intrusion. 
B. DEFINING THE TIERED FRAMEWORK 
A hybrid-scope-limited framework for electronic border searches links the scope of 
electronic device searches to the broad, historically accepted rationale behind the border 
search doctrine. Under this frame, the examination of electronic devices at the border in 
their most basic form; i.e., manual (user interface) searches, is related to the following 
concerns: 
∑ national security, 
∑ the collection of duty and regulation of trade, 
∑ preventing the introduction of harmful goods, and 
∑ regulating immigration to prevent the entry of illegal, inadmissible, or 
unwanted persons. 
Although these concerns authorize broad, suspicion-less customs searches of 
electronic data they do not authorize limitless searches. This scope-limited rule truncates 
suspicion-less electronic border searches to data—consistent with the hybrid view—that is 
comparable to physical, tangible property or that may contain information affecting 
elemental government concerns. This scope-limitation thus extends established border 
principles originally developed for traditional property to modern electronic devices while 
still respecting their hybrid nature. Thus, while digital photographs and electronic messages 
are susceptible to suspicion-less search, a digital effect like health monitoring data is not. 
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1. The Two-Tier Concept 
The hybrid-scope-limited approach for electronic border searches incorporates a 
tiered approach. These tiers, as first espoused in Cotterman and developed post-Riley in 
Kolsuz, act as a mechanism for increasing the scope of an electronic border search when—
as with the Buie rule for protective sweeps—increased suspicion is present. In this frame, 
the first tier of electronic border searches encompasses scope-limited, manual (user 
interface) searches. Here, customs officers can search data and electronic communications 
for information related to the four core areas of government concern at the border but 
cannot search novel digital effects like internet activity or geolocation data.306 The second 
tier—when customs officers have reasonable suspicion—allows officials to expand the 
scope of their search to all data for evidence of criminal activity and to use techniques 
beyond just manual (user interface) searches. In particular, second-tier, electronic border 
searches could involve the use of forensic software tools, like those discussed in  
Chapter II, where every byte of memory on a device is copied and available for search. 
This tiered construct follows from the scope escalators tied to enhanced suspicion 
present in other established warrantless search rationales. The tiered, hybrid-scope-limited 
framework also remains faithful to existing border search rules that clearly distinguish 
personal searches from property searches.307 This framework preserves the long-standing 
dynamic at the border where government interests are well-established and very 
powerful.308 But it also denies the government carte blanche permission to employ invasive 
search methodologies that substantially interfere with a traveler’s interests in his electronic 
devices absent greater suspicion. Only with reasonable suspicion can the government 
expand searches of electronic devices and enhance their depth and breadth with the aid of 
forensic tools. 
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2. The Reasonableness of Forensic Electronic Border Searches 
Forensic searches of electronic devices use specialized software to make an 
identical copy of the whole of the data present on a particular device.309 Among other 
things, the process reveals data that may have been deleted and that which is opaque to the 
device’s owner during regular use.310 The original border search statutes discussed the 
authorities of “customs officers” to act more intrusively when they had “reasons to suspect” 
criminal activity was present, including violations of customs laws.311 Forensic border 
searches are more invasive in their manner and potentially in their scope because, unlike 
physical, visual examinations of traditional property, they collect more information than 
the human eye. In the context of Cotterman’s luggage analogy, forensic searches parallel 
searching a piece of luggage for not only the items currently contained therein but for 
anything that had ever been carried within the luggage.312 They can uncover data that has 
been deleted as well as items of metadata which provides for increased granularity in a 
customs search. They also frequently involve the temporary deprivation a device from its 
owner. But, in the context of a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited framework, such search is only 
permissible when customs officers’ have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—in 
other words cause. The requirement for reasonable suspicion to conduct forensic electronic 
border searches is reasonable at the border as it is consistent with the legislative history of 
the doctrine that authorizes customs officers to act more intrusively when armed with 
greater suspicion. 
Ironically, however, forensic electronic border searches are also reasonable given 
that these searches hold potential benefit for travelers as well. Forensic border searches do 
involve travelers being deprived of their property. But travelers would experience such a 
deprivation even if customs officers, armed with reasonable suspicion, only searched 
electronic devices visually. Given the storage capacity of modern electronic devices, a 
manual, user-interface searches would be very time consuming. This would necessarily 
 
309 Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,” 541. 
310 Kerr, 542. 
311 Peters, Public Statutes at Large, 43. 
312 See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965. 
64 
require that the traveler be deprived of his device for an extended period of time. But, 
forensic software allows the government to execute its electronic border search off-
device.313 A device would only need to be possessed by customs officers long enough to 
ensure a bitstream copy of the data had been accurately obtained.314 The device would then 
be available for return to the traveler even if the search of the copied data had not yet been 
completed. In other words, the use of forensic tools to conduct an electronic border search 
with reasonable suspicion actually could result in a more reasonable intrusion on a 
traveler’s property rights—a shorter property deprivation—than a manual, user-interface 
search. 
Forensic searches, despite the increased intrusiveness of their manner, are 
reasonable because they can limit the length of time the government searches a traveler’s 
data. Specifically, forensic searches, beyond manual searches, enable customs officers to 
more quickly and precisely either develop their reasonable suspicion into probable cause 
or dispel that suspicion all together. They also allow customs officers to conduct targeted 
searches.315 For instance, key word searches can be conducted with forensic tools thereby 
allowing for a more targeted search activity. This can result in only exposing data related 
to the reasonable suspicion that originally justified the use of more invasive techniques.316 
Nathan Sales has likened forensic key word searches to “dog sniff[s]” of physical 
property.317 Only the data that has been alerted to customs officers’ attention via the 
keyword searches need be examined in greater detail.318 Hence, the reasonableness of 
forensic electronic border searches is enhanced because a they can preserve a traveler’s 
privacy in other, unrelated data.319 
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Importantly too, forensic searches ensure that only the data carried on a device 
across the border is subject to search. In this way, a forensic border search could not stray 
impermissibly into data stored off-device in the “cloud.”320 Finally, a forensic border 
search provides a snap shot in time of the data contained on an electronic device. Kerr has 
recognized that searches with forensic tools afford an “evidentiary integrity of the original 
evidence,” that is not possible with manual searches.321 Thus, the reasonableness of 
forensic electronic border searches is further established by the fact that in the event of 
future litigation, travelers and defense attorneys are assured of the exact context in which 
items of data indicative of criminal activity were found. 
3. The Need to Follow Terry’s Definition of Reasonable Suspicion 
For many reasons, Terry’s constitutionally accepted definition of reasonable 
suspicion, tying it to evidence of criminal activity, is the one that must be followed for 
electronic border searches in the second tier of the proposed framework. Straying from this 
definition as courts that have confronted the question of electronic border searches since 
Riley have, leads to illogical results. Any adoption of a novel definition for reasonable 
suspicion, specifically in the context of border searches of electronic devices, recalls the 
now discredited attempts by the Ninth Circuit in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to arbitrarily 
manufacture an entirely new level of suspicion for personally intrusive border searches.322 
Reasonable suspicion has been established as the highest level of justification 
necessary for any government border search.323 At the border, reasonable suspicion allows 
for intimate breaches of a person’s body regardless of the fact that the “integrity of an 
 
320 Margaret Rouse, “Cloud Storage,” SearchStorage, accessed September 18, 2020, 
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individual’s person is a cherished value in [American] society.”324 But a novel definition 
of reasonable suspicion for electronic border searches would create a huge imbalance in 
which the government has the authority to grossly invade a traveler’s body but not his 
electronic device. For instance, a restrictive definition of reasonable suspicion, like one 
limiting that suspicion to the presence of child pornography, would create declare 
significant invasions of a person’s body to recover any item, including an electronic device, 
acceptable, but not a search of the data present on a recovered device. Courts have logically 
found that subjecting individuals to the indignities of revealing their bodies and probing 
their orifices represent more severe invasions of privacy than that involved in the search of 
property, even when the property is electronic in nature.325 A special definition of 
reasonable suspicion narrower than Terry, however, violates this logic. Such a definition 
would strangely declare invasive searches of the body as less offensive than searches of 
digital property. 
a. Problems Created by the Kolsuz-Aigbekaen Standard 
The Kolsuz definition of reasonable suspicion is too restrictive. Its definition, 
further enshrined in Aigbekaen, also goes beyond Terry’s long-standing linkage of 
reasonableness to criminal activity. The Kolsuz-Aigbekaen standard imposes a nexus 
requirement—–one that limits reasonable suspicion only to criminal activity of an 
“ongoing” and “transnational” character.326 Those courts sought to align second-tier, 
forensic electronic border searches to material related to the government’s broad, historic 
interests at the border versus “generalized” crime-fighting.327 However, these courts, in 
inventing a novel definition of reasonable suspicion relative to the border search of the 
electronic devices, implicitly composed dueling definitions of reasonable suspicion in the 
border environment: one rooted in criminal activity for searches of people and traditional 
property and one that requires a nexus to “ongoing transnational crime” for electronic 
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devices only.328 Accordingly, Kolsuz and Aigbekaen establish a two-track definition of 
reasonable suspicion at the border that again promotes form over substance. A customs 
officer can conduct invasive, physical searches of people or destructive searches of 
property with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity but can only forensically search 
electronic devices with reasonable suspicion when that suspicion is tied to crimes that are 
transnational in nature. It is an inconsistency not readily explainable when “the object of 
the search” and not what is being searched is what is important.329 Such a definition of 
reasonable suspicion threatens doctrinal consistency in property searches at the border and 
sets a dangerous precedent potentially opening the door for the creation of multiple 
categorical border search rules. 
Kolsuz’s and Aigbekaen’s definition of reasonable suspicion is also problematic 
because it ignores the statutory standing of customs officers. All customs officers who 
police the borders are also sworn federal law enforcement officers authorized to enforce 
customs statutes and other federal criminal statutes.330 For instance, HSI Special Agents, 
are customs officers who are also responsible for the enforcement of more than 400 statutes 
of the United States criminal code.331 Their investigative and enforcement authority is 
rooted in Title 19—the Customs title—among other statutes.332 The Kolsuz-Aigbekaen 
standard would require courts to speculate as to which crimes fall under the broad umbrella 
of customs officers’ authority and which do not. This standard could quickly become 
murky in an era in which evolving technology, trade, travel, and finance blurs any bright 
line seeking to separate wholly internal criminal activity from that which has some 
cross-border character. 
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In addition, the Kolsuz-Aigbekaen reasonable suspicion standard presents other 
logical dilemmas leading to uncertainty in application. Those courts own pronouncements 
about tethering reasonable suspicion to the established purposes of the border search 
doctrine and that forensic electronic border searches are reasonable so long as they are 
related to “ongoing transnational crime” conflict with one another.333 For instance, consider 
a customs broker working alone and falsifying declarations for merchandise that has 
already been imported. A forensic electronic border search of digital devices belonging to 
the customs broker for evidence related to his fraud would certainly be included under the 
rationale for the existence of broad customs search authority. Despite the fact that the goods 
mentioned on the fraudulent paperwork may have traveled internationally, the customs 
broker’s fraud is wholly domestic. Under the Kolsuz-Aigbekaen view of reasonable 
suspicion, it may be that the international nexus; i.e., the goods crossing the border, is not 
strong enough to support a lawful border search.334 Consider as well the potential nexus of 
a money launderer based in the United States. His illegal actions may not implicate 
questions related to customs interests as they have been defined but may have “ongoing” 
and “transnational” components.335 This situation could happen if the money launderer 
uses virtual currencies or electronic communications to perpetrate his crimes that reside on 
or pass through internationally based servers. Whether this situation would constitute a 
sufficient international nexus under the Kolsuz-Aigbekaen frame to justify a forensic border 
search remains unknown. 
Additional problems with the Kolsuz-Aigbekaen nexus test can be seen in 
considering other criminal activity with potential international components. Consider a 
domestic homicide committed by a member of the gang MS-13. Kolsuz and Aigbekaen 
would certainly characterize an electronic border search of a homicide suspect as being of 
a “generalized” investigatory nature and would see any reasonable suspicion of a homicide 
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as unconnected to the border search doctrine’s purpose.336 But gangs like MS-13 and others 
do operate internationally.337 At higher levels, domestic gang leaders and foreign-based 
members communicate.338 So while the homicide suspect may not have such contact, his 
parent gang may. And in that case, would the electronic border search then not be 
reasonably related to “ongoing transnational crime?”339 Finally, consider the application of 
the Kolsuz reasonable suspicion standard to street level cocaine distribution. Such conduct 
may not be transnational but when viewed through the understanding that cocaine is not 
manufactured in the United States but rather flows across the national boundaries, such 
activity does have a nexus to the border and relates to customs interests.340 These scenarios 
bring into sharp relief the logical problems and application hurdles of the Kolsuz-
Aigbekaen reasonable suspicion standard. Moreover, they ignore what one jurist from the 
Kolsuz-Aigbekaen Circuit has recognized: “The purposes of the border-search doctrine 
overlap to some degree with general law enforcement.”341 
Notably, the Aigbekaen court confronted the problems created by the nexus test and 
failed to logically apply it. That failure occurred when that court left unaddressed an 
important fact which should have upended its analysis. In finding an electronic border 
search of a suspect involved in domestic sex trafficking as unreasonable because the 
reasonable suspicion did not relate to “ongoing transnational” criminal activity, the court 
did acknowledge that the main suspect was Nigerian.342 Though the court did not specify 
the suspect’s immigration status, the opinion did tacitly acknowledge that the individual 
was not a U.S. national as the term is defined in law.343 This status meant the suspect was 
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a foreign national subject to a range of U.S. immigration laws. Depending then on the 
extent and the nature of his misconduct, the suspect may have been inadmissible or 
otherwise subject to removal proceedings under those laws.344 According to Aigbekaen’s 
own rationale, following that of Kolsuz, enforcing immigration laws and preventing 
undesirable persons from entering the country falls square within the border search 
mandate.345 Following the lessons of Kolsuz then, the court should have endorsed, not 
nullified, the reasonableness of the border search.346 The Aigbekaen court, however, in 
attempting to follow in Kolsuz’s footsteps and substantiate a novel reasonable suspicion 
standard failed to logically apply that standard. 
b. Clarity via the Terry Standard 
Importantly, even those who are critical of electronic border searches and who have 
argued for implementation of a reasonable suspicion standard for some electronic border 
searches ascribe to the Terry definition.347 Tethering reasonable suspicion to “criminal 
activity” still affords the protection of privacy in electronic data desired by Kolsuz but 
eliminates its logical inconsistencies.348 Whereas the Kolsuz-Aigbekaen standard may have 
difficulty assessing the reasonableness of a forensic border search of a suspected terrorist, 
one who while posing a national security threat, may not include a threat of an “ongoing” 
or “transnational” character, the Terry standard makes no such distinction.349 Adherence to 
Kolsuz-Aigbekaen reasonable suspicion construct allows the electronic devices of a radical 
Salafist-jihadist to be forensically border searched but demands that devices of a white-
supremacist terrorist be excepted. Each one threatens the sovereign’s security, but Kolsuz-
Aigbekaen rule fosters anomalous results. 
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Returning to the established Terry standard is the best approach for establishing the 
reasonableness benchmark for second-tier border searches using forensic tools. That 
standard is consistent and well-established. It avoids creating different definitions for 
reasonable suspicion in the border environment. It avoids the logical inconsistencies 
created by more restrictive definitions of that term. Terry’s reasonable suspicion definition 
also eliminates the problems and uncertainty created by the Kolsuz-Aigbekaen definition. 
It does not require nuanced assessments as to whether illegal activity is of a sufficient 
transnational character to authorize searches of increased scope and manner. By linking 
reasonable suspicion to the presence of criminal activity, customs officers can be clear and 
certain as to when second-tier, forensic electronic border searches may be conducted. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach to electronic border searches addresses 
concerns centered on their potentially boundless nature. It also mitigates concerns as to the 
manner in which electronic border searches are conducted. The framework’s tiered 
construct provides for a measured approach requiring greater intrusions to have greater 
justification. The tiered, hybrid-scope-limited model achieves this not through haphazard 
rule-making but through the tailoring of long-recognized principles. In addition to limiting 
the scope of suspicion-less searches, it also limits their manner. It also, however, allows 
for electronic border searches to expand with increased justification. This model sanctions 
the use of forensic tools and an increased search scope, beyond the elemental interests the 
government has for conducting searches of property at the border, when reasonable 
suspicion is present. In particular, when customs officers are armed with increased 
suspicion, forensic electronic border searches, though seemingly more invasive, are a 
reasonable search modality. Finally, the reasonable suspicion requirement for second-tier 
electronic border searches in this electronic border search framework must adhere to 
Terry’s definition in order to avoid anomalous and illogical results. 
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V. CONCLUSION: GUIDANCE FOR PRACTITIONERS 
Adopting a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited framework in an electronic border search 
policy could guide customs officers in their exercise of this unique authority. It could assist 
customs officers in properly scoping their suspicion-less, user-interface searches in the first 
tier. It could also provide how the manner of their search can expand, using forensic tools, 
in the second tier, when the officer has reasonable suspicion. Although CBP updated its 
electronic border search policy in 2018, ICE-HSI’s new policy is still under revision in 
light of issues raised by courts in the post-Riley era.350 Any customs agency interested in 
developing, reviewing, or amending its policy regarding electronic devices encountered at 
the border can benefit from an articulation of a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited framework. 
Such a policy provides a baseline on which customs officers can conduct their searches of 
electronic devices. It also fosters uniformity by eliminating vagaries in practice, thereby, 
making the overall execution of electronic border searches more reasonable. In addition, a 
policy instituting the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach promotes perceptions of 
reasonableness by aligning with other legally accepted precedents. 
This final chapter examines how the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited framework 
maintains the historic balance between the power of the government and individual privacy 
rights at the border. An answer to the first research question—whether or not electronic 
border searches after Riley continue to be constitutionally acceptable—follows. Next, this 
chapter answers the other question: how can the constitutional reasonableness of electronic 
border searches be maintained in the long term? It discusses how the tiered, hybrid-scope-
limited approach for electronic border searches can guide customs officers in the exercise 
of their authority and how existing rules can be translated to address novel issues presented 
by modern technology. This chapter concludes by looking at why electronic border 
searches conducted in accordance with the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited model represent a 
reasonable and necessary resolution to the electronic border search debate that has grown 
since the Riley decision. 
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A. TIERED, HYBRID-SCOPE-LIMITED APPROACH: MAINTAINING THE 
BORDER BALANCE 
The tiered, hybrid-scope-limited rule for electronic border searches preserves the 
historic, purposefully established tension between the competing interests of government 
in promoting safety, security, and the popular welfare versus the privacy rights of the 
individual. Importantly, the rule seeks balance not equality. The balance to be struck at the 
border leans heavily in favor of the government and customs searches are meant to be of 
“broadest possible character.”351 The depth and character of reasonable government 
searches at the border can be extreme, like those involving a person’s body cavities.352 
Similar searches in the interior would be excessive. Thus, the border search doctrine’s 
purpose is to allow for searches that while unreasonable in the interior are reasonable at 
the border.353 
Likewise, unlike in the interior, encounters between people and government 
officials are not consensual but obligatory. People must provide information to the 
government concerning private details about their travel, currency, and items they seek to 
bring into the country. Failures or inaccuracies subject one to the potential of criminal 
penalties.354 So different is the legal paradigm of the border that at one point Congress 
required individuals with a history of drug offenses to register with and self-declare to 
customs officers upon seeking to enter or exit the United States.355 The imposition of such 
affirmative requirements on travelers to present themselves and their property for 
inspection when crossing the border demonstrates the obvious weight of government 
authority to preserve the safety and security of nation at the expense of personal liberty. 
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Any artificial limitations of manual electronic border searches based on Riley’s 
rationale are also misguided. If the border balance aims for the sovereign to protect itself 
through “plenary customs power,” then the rules delineated in Cano and Alasaad are not 
viable.356 Limiting manual electronic border searches only to situations where reasonable 
suspicion of contraband exists is far too restrictive.357 Preventing a border search from 
seeking out data beyond that which only involves child pornography is both unreasonable 
and unsupported in law. Rationale for the border search doctrine has never been limited to 
simply discovering contraband.358 Such a rule is inconsistent with the purpose underlying 
the border search doctrine, which is sovereign protection. 
But another artificial rule, one that limits manual electronic border searches only to 
determine whether data is present on a device, is more dangerous still.359 Such a rule would 
destroy the long-established border equilibrium effectively rendering the border search 
doctrine impotent. It would grant perfect protection to national, customs, and immigration 
threats based merely on their form in binary code. Extending the rationale of one court to 
the potentiality of such a rule begs the question: if digital devices and data are “to be left 
unwatched,” what is the purpose of subjecting all persons and physical goods to border 
searches, no matter how intrusive the manner or how private the item?360 This rule would 
reduce the government’s ability to protect the nation at the borders based on form alone. 
Rather than crafting new rules that disturb the purposefully established balance between 
the government and the individual at the border, the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach 
transfers the desired balance from the realm of physical property to the digital one. The 
reasonableness of border searches then is not determined by what is being searched but 
rather by the purpose and scope of the search.  
 
356 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616. 
357 See Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 730 (Richardson, J., concurring): “This ‘contraband-only’ view might 
be too narrow given the interests of the United States, as sovereign, at its territorial borders.” 
358 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606. 
359 See Alasaad, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC.  
360 Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 218 (1883). 
76 
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ELECTRONIC BORDER SEARCHES 
AFTER RILEY 
Though Riley shifted the Fourth Amendment dynamic for warrantless searches of 
electronic devices in the interior, at the border, such searches continue to be constitutionally 
permissible. In the six years since the Riley decision, no court has outlawed the electronic 
border search practice or imposed categorical warrant requirements. Thus, for all of 
argument over whether Riley created a new, special category for electronic devices, courts 
have continued to find that customs search authority does include the power to search 
personal electronic devices and data. 
Aside from the judiciary’s continuing sanction, other reasons explored in this thesis 
establish Riley’s limited impact on electronic border search practice. Chiefly, Congress has 
“declared that a search which [is] ‘unreasonable’ . . . if conducted by police officers” within 
the U.S. is “reasonable if conducted by customs officials” in furtherance of their duties at 
the border.361 The government’s power to search at the border simply cannot be so 
“severely impede[d]” that it wholly affects the efficacy of the government efforts to fulfill 
core interests of sovereignty.362 Of added significance was the Riley Court’s decision to 
choose a case involving the SIA exception to discuss the uniqueness of electronic devices 
restricts Riley’s application. Far from seeking to confine the authority of customs officers, 
the High Court has admonished lower courts “to interpret the [border search] doctrine 
broadly and avoid creating new limitations.” 363 In this respect, border searches are unique. 
The border search doctrine is the product of a deliberately constructed two-fold search 
paradigm: one set of rules for the border and another for the interior. Border searches stand 
independently from other searches. They have not been carved from but rather exist 
alongside the Fourth Amendment. 
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C. ENSURING THE REASONABLENESS OF ELECTRONIC BORDER 
SEARCHES 
Finding electronic border searches as constitutionally reasonable post-Riley, 
however, only addresses one of the questions posed by this thesis. The second focuses on 
ensuring their continued reasonableness moving forward. It is foreseeable that evolving 
technologies will make the bright-line border search rule allowing robust searches of 
anything crossing the border, tangible or intangible, increasingly controversial. So, while 
wholly outlawing electronic border searches is neither desirable nor logical, an enduring 
solution to maintaining their reasonableness must not gloss over the central role electronic 
devices and data increasingly play in people’s lives. Instead of following a categorical, 
anything-goes-at-the-border view, electronic border searches should be rooted in the 
original purposes for the doctrine. By doing so, reasonable limitations can be imposed on 
the scope and manner of suspicion-less customs searches, thereby ensuring their continued 
compatibility with the Constitution in the future. 
The hybrid-scope-limited approach that this thesis suggests imposes such limits. 
By treating electronic devices as both containers and novel property in which both the 
government and the individual have compelling interests, the approach tailors the scope of 
customs searches in a reasonable way. It preserves the ability of the government to guard 
against traditional threats now stored or facilitated electronically. Simultaneously though, 
the approach protects personal privacy by not allowing the government unfettered access 
to the whole of a person’s digital life absent more. The approach also limits the 
government’s interference with a traveler’s possessory interests in his electronic devices 
by limiting the manner in which a suspicion-less electronic border search can be conducted. 
The addition of a second-tier border search also provides a mechanism to reasonably 
balance the competing interests of the state and individual at the border; one where the 
scope and manner of search can be expanded but only with reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. 
The tiered, hybrid-scope-limited framework for electronic border searches, thus, 
not only promotes but provides for the continuing maintenance of the reasonableness of 
such searches. It creates a flexible electronic border search rule that focuses on the 
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substance of the data held in electronic devices, not its unique form. This focus allows the 
rule to translate existing rules to new types of property, making it adaptable as necessary 
to deal with advances in technology. The tiered nature of the framework affords customs 
officers greater authority to protect important national interests when greater justification 
is present. On a macro level, this framework ensures electronic border search’s long-term 
constitutionality while preserving the purposefully established dynamic that offsets 
personal privacy with uniquely broad government power at the border. At a micro level, 
the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited frame provides a conceptual basis for customs officers to 
use in exercising their electronic border search authority. This framework can guide 
customs officers when confronting ever-evolving forms of property and dealing with the 
distinctive issues they present. 
D. PRACTITIONER’S GUIDANCE: DEALING WITH NOVEL 
ELECTRONIC BORDER SEARCH ISSUES 
Questions over government searches of electronic devices and data are not going 
away, especially at the border. In 2015 alone, in excess of 382 million travelers crossed the 
U.S. border at various ports of entry.364 Given the ubiquity of electronic devices 
acknowledged by the Riley court, one may easily assume that the number of electronic 
devices that crossed the border in the carriage of these travelers was far greater.365 
Accordingly, border searches where electronic devices are involved will only grow. 
Therefore, customs officers need to be prepared for the novel issues presented by electronic 
devices and ensure that their border searches are fairly conducted. 
The tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach can provide conceptual guidance to 
customs officers in conducting electronic border searches and in confronting issues unique 
to such searches. These issues include: cloud connectivity, copying and retaining electronic 
data, and confronting locked and encrypted devices. Guidance for confronting these issues 
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is discussed in the following sections. Notably, the guidance discussed does not consist of 
a checklist for customs officers to follow. Adherence to a checklist is not a guarantee of 
reasonableness in every case. For instance, existing policies that are being reconsidered in 
light of Kolsuz and other cases articulate that devices can be detained for 30 days with a 
15-day extension granted by a supervisor.366 But just because a customs officer’s detention 
of electronic devices meets this timeline does not establish his conduct as reasonable on its 
face. A customs officer may meet this policy requirement if he detained a traveler’s 
electronic devices but waited until day 28 to conduct his border search. The customs officer 
may very well accomplish his search and return the devices by day 30 but the act of waiting 
until day 28 to conduct the search could be determined to be unreasonable in that it resulted 
in a traveler being deprived of his property longer than was necessary. Conversely, there 
might be extenuating circumstances that increase the time necessary to undertake a border 
search making such a search far beyond 30 days reasonable. Because Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness is quite frequently dependent on the particular facts surrounding a search, 
a universal checklist is of limited value. Instead, conceptual guidance provides a frame for 
the discretionary decision-making of customs officers when dealing with searches of 
electronic devices and the unique issues they present. Such guidance also instructs customs 
officers as to how to articulate the reasonableness of their conduct. 
1. “Cloud” Connected Devices and Programs 
Under a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited framework, electronic border searches must 
continue to be limited to only that which has been downloaded to a device by the user prior 
to crossing the border. Any data not within the physical memory of such a device as it 
transits the border cannot reasonably fall within the scope of a proper electronic border 
search. This limitation is important because today’s electronic devices can access 
information both stored on the device and stored elsewhere. A device can do this by 
accessing different data sites via the internet or by accessing the user’s data stored, not on 
the device, but on remote, disparate servers. The latter is “cloud” data, to which a user has 
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ready and immediate access.367 A traveler can access such data either by linking his 
electronic device to such storage or through the use of cloud-based applications and 
programs.368 Data stored in the “cloud,” however, is not data stored or contained within an 
electronic device itself.369 This type of data gave the Riley court pause in the context of 
searches of electronic devices incident to arrest. 
Critics, too, have expressed concerns that electronic border searches are 
unreasonable because they could stray into off-device, cloud data, including data that 
reveals intimate information of one’s home.370 But, in order to view this data, network 
connectivity for the device is required. To achieve this physical scope-limitation, customs 
officers can isolate electronic devices from wireless and cellular networks, utilizing device 
“airplane modes,” before initiating any border search.371 Such action prevents any data 
transmission to and from a device. Thus, data stored remotely would be inaccessible. 
Personal information held and accessed via cloud-based applications on a traveler’s 
electronic device would be physically beyond the reach of a search at the border as well. 
Without a network connection, both the customs officer and the traveler can be confident 
that the only information subject to search is that which is present within the physical 
memory of the device. Then, only data that physically crossed the border is available for 
examination. 
2. Data Copying and Retention 
Electronic border searches conducted within the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited 
framework do allow customs offices to copy a traveler’s data with reasonable suspicion, 
and retain that data with cause to believe that the data contains evidence of a crime. To 
 
367 Rouse, “Cloud Storage.” 
368 Zach Barton, “What Is a Cloud Application?,” CloudBakers (blog), April 18, 2018, https://www.
cloudbakers.com/blog/what-is-a-cloud-application. 
369 Rouse, “Cloud Storage.” 
370 See Donohue, “Customs, Immigration, and Rights.” 
371 Philip Bates, “What Is Airplane Mode on IPhone? Everything You Need to Know,” MakeUseOf, 
June 22, 2020, https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/everything-need-know-airplane-mode-iphone-ipad/. The 
policy specifically directs CBP officers to ensure all inspected devices are unconnected to networks or 
otherwise placed in airplane mode.  
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date, fears related to the copying and retention of a traveler’s private data have fueled 
concerns as to the unreasonableness of electronic border searches.372 Some fear that such 
a practice portends the creation of a government surveillance state while others fear that 
their privacy may be permanently compromised as travelers’ lose possession and control 
over the dissemination of their data.373 Customs officers, however, are permitted to make 
copies of documents and other information in the “paper world.”374 For example, customs 
officers can copy and retain physical property, including documents, if translation is 
required or if assistance from outside experts is necessary to determine whether the 
contents relate to violations of customs laws.375 In addition, the federal rules of criminal 
procedure authorize the copying of data from electronic devices for the purpose of 
facilitating a law enforcement search.376 Within the United States, the government’s 
copying of data pursuant to searches of electronic devices is judged only by what is 
reasonable.377 That reasonableness hinges only on what is the government’s rationale for 
copying of data. Thus, these federal rules recognize that “as long as the government has a 
law enforcement purpose in copying records, there is no reason why it should be saddled 
with a heavy burden of justifying” such action.378 
 
372 “Border Agents Are Copying Travelers’ Data, Leaving It on USB Drives,” Naked Security (blog), 
December 13, 2018, https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/12/13/border-agents-are-copying-travelers-
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373 See, generally, Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,” 569; and Kerr, “Fourth 
Amendment Seizures of Computer Data,”703–5. 
374 Robles, Law Course, 179, discusses the authority to copy documents at the border with reasonable 
suspicion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, Committee Notes on Rules–2009 Amendment (seeking to maintain the 
protocols for copying and searching computer data as consistent with the copying and searching of paper 
documents).  
375 Robles, Law Course, 179. 
376 H. Marshall Jarrett et al., Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal Investigations (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2009), 76–78; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, 
Committee Notes on Rules–2009 Amendment (“acknowledg[ing] the need for a two-step process: officers 
may seize or copy the entire storage medium and review it later to determine what electronically stored 
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377 “The fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable seizures . . . and reasonableness under 
all of the circumstances must be the test when a person seeks to obtain the return of property. . . . If the 
United States’ legitimate interests can be satisfied even if the property is returned, continued retention of 
the property would become unreasonable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, Committee Notes on Rules–2009 
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Within the second tier of the proposed framework, once reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity has been developed, a forensic border search in which a traveler’s data is 
copied, may be conducted. Here, constitutional reasonableness is satisfied because once 
armed with reasonable suspicion, customs officers have a legitimate interest in copying the 
data. Data copying affords customs officers the ability to detain a traveler’s data in its 
original form in order to facilitate a further, in depth review—the goal of which is to resolve 
that suspicion. This copying and limited retention of data is akin to an “investigative 
detention” under Terry.379 Accordingly, the copying and retention would fulfill the narrow 
purpose of allowing customs officers to conduct a review to determine whether items 
within the data are evidence of crime thereby establishing probable cause. As with Terry, 
this “investigative detention” of the information cannot be unduly long.380 Rather, in 
copying and retaining data for this purpose, customs officers must demonstrate due 
diligence in reviewing the data to either confirm or dispel suspicions.381 If items of data 
afford probable cause of criminal activity, the data, just as it would under Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 41, can be seized and preserved; i.e., retained, as evidence.382 If 
probable cause is not developed, the data must be destroyed. 
In addition, documentation capturing the copying and retention or destruction of 
data obtained under electronic border searches is important. Justice Breyer has noted the 
importance of record-keeping as an element of reasonableness in the conduct of border 
searches.383 With defined reporting requirements as part of a tiered, hybrid-scope-limited 
electronic border search policy, ad hoc practices like when customs officers conduct 
 
379 Steven L. Argiriou, “Terry Stop Update: The Law, Field Examples and Analysis,” Federal Law 
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pursuant to a forensic border search is mandatory for the government to meet its discovery obligations. 
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electronic border searches by downloading personal data on to thumb-drives without any 
chain of custody can be prevented.384 Specifically, when data copied from devices detained 
at the border are devoid of criminal evidence, customs officers operating within the second 
tier of the proposed framework, should document their negative findings and ensure any 
data that have been copied are erased. If information reviewed does reveal evidence of 
crime, documentation recording the seizure and retention of that data as evidence should 
be accomplished. Such a protocol adheres to accepted electronic device search 
methodologies for the copying and retention of data and, when coupled with appropriate 
documentation, establishes, on its face, the reasonableness of customs officers’ conduct 
when conducting second-tier electronic border searches. 
3. Locked Devices and Encryption 
In exercising their border search authority over electronic devices in a tiered, 
hybrid-scope-limited scheme, customs officers have the authority to demand that electronic 
devices be unlocked and decrypted in order to allow for examination of their digital 
contents. The design of modern electronic devices which enable them to be locked, 
password protected, and their data encrypted present challenges to customs officers’ 
authority. But compliance with customs officers at the border is not a choice, and border 
searches are not consensual.385 Customs officers can exercise “all necessary force” to 
“compel compliance” in the conduct of their border search authority.386 So it stands then 
that the government is not impotent when confronted with locked or encrypted electronic 
device at the border. The government’s authority for dealing with such situations is 
constitutionally implicit and sanctioned under the concept of implied powers. It is 
axiomatic that “clearly established in law or in reason . . . that wherever the end is required, 
the means are authorized.”387 Put another way, “wherever a general power to do a thing is 
 
384 “Border Agents Are Copying Travelers’ Data.” 
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386 19 U.S.C. § 1581. 
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given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.”388 Therefore, because the 
government has a general power to conduct border searches of persons and property, which 
include electronic devices, it can reasonably exercise the necessary power to effect its 
search and overcome obstacles presented by technology. 
Moreover, border search statutes already contemplate encounters with locked 
containers. Here the government’s authority at the border is legislatively explicit. Customs 
officers have long had the power to “demand” keys from any traveler to examine a locked 
container.389 In instances when a traveler refuses to unlock a container or provide a key in 
order to facilitate a border examination, a customs officer has recourse.390 Congress has 
stated that, under these circumstances, customs officers “shall” detain the locked container 
for the purposes of gaining access to its contents and undertaking a border examination.391 
Under a hybrid view of electronic devices, the same rationale would apply to locked 
electronic devices and encrypted data. If information that affects the broad scope of the 
government’s authority at the border is to be subject to inspection, then the locking of 
devices or the presence of encryption should not defeat the exercise of border search 
authority. Just as a traveler cannot avoid a customs examination of the contents of his 
briefcase merely by refusing to provide its combination, a traveler cannot sidestep a search 
of his electronics merely by refusing to provide his passwords. 
Constitutional principles of reasonableness and implied powers afford customs 
officers the ability to demand decryption passwords to view pertinent information stored 
on a device. If a traveler refuses to comply, customs officers can reasonably hold a device 
up to a traveler’s face or demand their finger prints to accomplish unlocking and 
decryption. If a traveler continues to resist and the physical unlocking measures described 
are unavailable to the customs officers, or cannot be reasonably undertaken, the device can 
be detained. The detention is not punitive. It also does not require any particular suspicion. 
Rather the purpose of the detention is simply to afford customs officers additional time to 
 
388 Madison, The Federalist No. 44. 
389 19 U.S.C. § 1461 (2018). 
390 19 U.S.C. § 1462 (2018). 
391 19 U.S.C. § 1462. 
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make efforts to overcome locked devices and encryption and execute a suspicion-less, 
hybrid-scope-limited, border search. This contingency is both reasonable and legislatively 
sanctioned in the border environment.392 
Unlocking electronic devices has been addressed by at least one court of review 
concerning electronic border searches. In Wanjiku, the Seventh Circuit dealt with the 
question of password protection and encryption. In seeking to conduct a border search of a 
traveler’s cellular phone, customs officers demanded the password to unlock the device.393 
The traveler was initially reticent.394 Customs officers then explained the device would be 
removed from traveler’s possession to effect a border a search.395 The traveler then 
provided this password.396 In reviewing this aspect of the encounter, the circuit court found 
no issue with the customs officers’ conduct and their actions were reasonable.397 The 
decision re-affirms that because border searches are not consensual a lack of cooperation 
by a traveler should not defeat the endeavor. 
Reasonableness in the exercise of electronic border search authority also commands 
that, absent such extenuating circumstances, as national security concerns, travelers should 
be aware that their electronic devices are being inspected.398 Customs officers should make 
every effort to conduct suspicion-less electronic border searches in the traveler’s presence. 
But it is reasonable for customs officer to make traveler’s aware, as was done in Wanjiku, 
of the results of their failure to facilitate such an inspection. Applying and adapting existing 
statutory authority to allow customs officers to demand that locked devices be unlocked, 
and to detain, if necessary, locked and encrypted devices, means travelers cannot defeat 
legitimate government interests in the border domain merely through the use of passwords. 
 
392 19 U.S.C. § 1462. 
393 Wanjiku, 919 F.3d at 477. 
394 Wanjiku, at 477. 
395 Wanjiku, at 477. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Constantly evolving technologies present challenges to maintaining both the 
effectiveness and reasonableness of government search and seizure authority. Government 
searches involving such technologies, like modern, mobile electronic devices, have the 
potential to more greatly intrude on a person’s privacy than searches of traditional property. 
This new type of property, however, has altered and enhanced the ability of individuals to 
threaten the U.S. and bypass customs laws. The government, within existing authorities, 
must be allowed to keep pace and even “catch up.”399 Creating special rules for every new 
technology that is developed is neither possible nor desirable. The result would be 
uncertainty and problems of logic of the kind pointed out by McAdams in the wake of 
Riley.400 Any such standard would prove universally unworkable and often be injurious to 
the public good.401 Also problematic is ignoring statutory rules and legislative guidance. 
Important lessons can be learned from Congressional attempts to balance government and 
personal interests when confronted with evolving technology.402 Such ignorance leads to 
rule-making in a vacuum based on narrow perspectives with potentially far-reaching 
consequences.403 
A tiered, hybrid-scope-limited electronic border search protocol allows existing 
rules governing border searches and searches of electronic data to be translated to confront 
novel issues presented by evolving technology. It fosters perceptions of legitimacy in such 
searches by recognizing that unlimited access to all electronic data without regard to the 
rationale underlying the existence of the border search doctrine is untenable. By charting a 
middle course, the tiered, hybrid-scope-limited approach to electronic border searches 
respects the intentionally created twin-search paradigm that views a search by a customs 
officer at the border as substantially different from all others. It, however, does so without 
needlessly trampling on personal privacy. 
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With the continuing technological changes of the modern world, electronic border 
searches are more seminal in their utility in protecting the government’s compelling 
interests than ever before. But a degree of balance must be maintained even when the 
government’s interests hold the trump card. The framework for electronic border searches 
discussed in this work avoids the crippling pitfall that would be created should the rhetoric 
of Riley be extended to the border search context in the future. The tiered, hybrid-scope-
limited framework preserves doctrinal consistency and maintains fidelity to the historic 
purpose of the border search doctrine. It is also more malleable. This framework is flexible 
enough to adapt to rapid advancements in technology and property whereby the long-term 
constitutionality in the application of electronic border search authority can be maintained. 
A tiered, hybrid-scope-limited construct makes the age-old border search rule, as applied 
to electronic devices and data, both more reasonable and enduring. 
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